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Since the 2008 financial crisis, consumer regulators have closely supervised sellers 
of credit cards and home mortgages to stamp out anticompetitive practices. Supervi-
sion programs give financial regulators ongoing access to sophisticated firms’ internal 
data outside the litigation process. This often enables examiners to identify and 
correct harmful conduct more rapidly and effectively than would be possible using 
publicly available information and cumbersome legal tools.  
Consumers spend four times more on retail goods than on financial products. 
The retail sector’s dominant firms—such as Amazon, Walmart, Unilever, and 
Kraft—employ large teams of quantitative experts armed with advanced infor-
mation technologies, huge volumes of data, and in-store experimentation to develop 
behavioral economics–related practices analogous to those seen in consumer finance. 
The empirical data suggest those practices in the aggregate may significantly harm 
all households, costing even a family at the poverty line hundreds of dollars annually. 
Yet unlike in consumer finance, regulators have declined to supervise sellers of retail 
goods.  
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This Article argues for wider adoption of the financial sector’s emerging—
though largely unarticulated—paradigm that views regulatory supervision of firms 
as central to consumer protection. That paradigm suggests the consumer goods sector 
needs the inverse of what consumer finance needed in the wake of the 2008 crisis. 
Then, Congress created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to provide more 
consumer protection because regulators had previously focused excessively on 
supervising financial institutions to ensure firms’ safety and soundness. In contrast, 
the consumer goods sector has a regulatory body—the Federal Trade Commission’s 
(FTC) Bureau of Consumer Protection—that focuses solely on consumer protection 
but does not supervise firms. Fortunately, congressional action would not be 
required for the FTC to develop a supervision program. The agency’s leadership 
would simply need to exercise the authority that Congress long ago granted. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Mass consumer goods are a $2.6 trillion dollar industry accounting for 
23% of household expenditures.1 Despite this scale, the sector’s dominant 
 
1 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CONSUMER EXPENDITURES IN 2012, at 8-9 
(2014), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/cex/consumer_expenditures2012.pdf; National 
Data: National Income and Product Accounts Tables, U.S. DEPARTMENT COM. BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS, 
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1#reqid=9&step=1&isuri=1 (open “Section 
2-Personal Income and Outlays” menu; then follow hyperlinks to Table 2.1 and Table 2.4.5) 
[hereinafter National Data] (estimating aggregate spending on goods). Figures exclude expendi-
tures on automobiles, gasoline, and cell phone services. The percent of expenditures is attained by 
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firms—such as Amazon, Target, Clorox, and Kraft—operate with little 
consumer protection oversight of the type found in consumer finance.2 It is 
typically assumed that consumers should spend the time necessary to find 
the best deal or be held responsible for the price they paid on simple items 
like clothing, food, cleaning products, and household appliances.  
The commercial and regulatory landscape in consumer goods today mirrors 
that in consumer finance prior to 2008. For years before the 2008 financial 
crisis, federal regulators mostly ignored the large body of scholarship arguing 
that financial institutions were becoming increasingly sophisticated at 
systematically exploiting consumers.3 The typical response was that 
consumers could handle it—that with a little effort and research they could 
 
summing the categories of expenditures for food at home, alcoholic beverages, housekeeping 
supplies, household furnishings and equipment, apparel and services, audio and visual equipment 
and services, personal care products and services, reading, and tobacco products and smoking 
supplies. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra. The aggregate spending on consumer 
goods is the sum of all goods categories in Table 2.4.5 except new motor vehicles, net purchase of 
used motor vehicles, gasoline and other energy goods, and pharmaceuticals, which totals $2.6 
trillion in 2012. See National Data, supra. 
2 The Federal Trade Commission does, however, enforce laws related to deceptive advertising 
in consumer goods markets, and its Antitrust Division monitors abuse of monopoly power. See, 
e.g., FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER INVESTIGATION DATA: FISCAL YEARS 1996–2007, at 17 
tbl.4.2 (2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports_annual/horizontal- 
merger-investigation-data-fiscal-years-1996-2007/081201hsrmergerdata_0.pdf (reporting FTC antitrust 
investigations in the grocery industry); Press Release, FTC, FTC Complaint Charges Deceptive 
Advertising by POM Wonderful (Sept. 27, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2010/09/ftc-complaint-charges-deceptive-advertising-pom-wonderful (announcing FTC 
complaint alleging that POM Wonderful made false claims about the health benefits of its 
products).  
3 As far back as 1984, William Eskridge identified systemic market failures in the mortgage 
industry and argued that consumers’ psychological limitations contributed to those failures. See 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant 
with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 
1083, 1145-46 (1984) (arguing that consumers’ psychological limitations cause them to shift 
decisionmaking responsibilities to intermediaries who have incentives to recommend suboptimal 
deals, which creates market failures in the mortgage industry); see also Kathleen C. Engel & 
Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. 
L. REV. 1255, 1337-57 (2002) (proposing a number of legislative and regulatory solutions to protect 
consumers from exploitative practices in the subprime mortgage market); Russell Korobkin, 
Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1217-
18 (2003) (arguing that boundedly rational consumers do not incorporate all available information 
into their purchase decisions, which creates incentives for sellers to include inefficient, low-quality 
terms); Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 881-84 (2007) 
(explaining how the mortgage industry practices of payday lenders make it difficult for consumers 
to estimate the cost of transactions or compare alternative transactions); Lauren E. Willis, 
Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 
707, 754-806 (2006) (exploring how the subprime home loan industry used sophisticated 
knowledge of demographics and consumer psychology to sell overpriced loans).  
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understand simple concepts such as monthly mortgage payments or credit 
card late fees.4 After the 2008 crisis a consensus emerged across the political 
spectrum that regulation may be needed in the face of the financial industry’s 
practices.5 Congress responded in part by adopting then-Professor Elizabeth 
Warren’s suggestion, later articulated in greater depth with Professor Oren 
Bar-Gill, to create a new federal agency to oversee credit product safety on 
behalf of consumers.6 The response can be seen as a paradigm shift toward 
examining firms’ data to correct market failures resulting from consumer 
irrationality and information asymmetries.7 
If this new paradigm is valid in consumer finance, a similar one is needed 
in the consumer goods sector. To be sure, the sector’s firms greatly benefit 
society. Large consumer goods companies such as Walmart enable signifi-
cantly lower prices. They have thus helped reduce an important measure of 
poverty—what consumers are actually able to purchase with their income.8 
 
4 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market Corrections, 73 
U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 118 (2006) (arguing that it is more efficient for individuals to protect 
themselves against error than it is to impose the burden on the legal system). 
5 See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND 
PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 116-22 (2012) (noting the role of subprime mortgage 
contracts in the 2008 financial crisis); JOHN A. SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 3 (4th ed. 2013) (asserting that unfair consumer credit agreements “may have 
led in part to the epidemic of subprime mortgage foreclosures and the financial crisis of 2007–
2008”); Alan Schwartz, Regulating for Rationality, 67 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) 
(manuscript at 3) (on file with author) (discussing the connection between the financial crisis and 
attention paid to consumer protection); Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Flaws in 
Deregulatory Approach, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at B1 (discussing former Federal Reserve 
Chairman Alan Greenspan’s admission that his free market ideology failed and that more 
regulation of the financial sector was needed). 
6 See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J., Summer 2007, at 9, available at 
http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/5/Warren.pdf (arguing for the creation of a new regulatory 
body to protect consumers of financial products). See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, 
Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 69 (2008) (providing in-depth analysis of the need for 
consumer protection in financial markets).  
7 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 6, at 21-22 (reviewing survey data indicating that consumers 
are uninformed and irrational in their approach to financial products). The Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau’s (CFPB) adoption of this paradigm was also influenced by, among others, 
Michael Barr and Sendhil Mullainathan, two leading scholars on behavioral economics–based 
regulation. See Michael S. Barr et al., The Case for Behaviorally Informed Regulation (explaining how 
“decisional conflict” often causes consumers to make choices that do not maximize value, and 
outlining a regulatory approach that takes empirical human behavior into account), in NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 25, 27 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009). As the 
U.S. Treasury Department’s assistant secretary, Barr was an architect of the Dodd–Frank Act and 
played a leadership role in laying the groundwork for the team, led by Elizabeth Warren, that 
would ultimately establish the CFPB. Mullainathan was an Assistant Director of Research at the CFPB.  
8 See Daniel Markovits, Snowball Inequality and the Crisis of Capitalism 20-21 (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1308100.files/February%2027/ 
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Consumer financial products have similarly brought great benefits to society 
by providing greater access to credit, thus enabling families to purchase 
homes and weather financial storms. 
The conclusion that the consumer goods sector nonetheless needs a 
regulatory paradigm similar to that in consumer finance rests on three 
counterintuitive premises, the case for each of which is absent from the 
literature. First, there is evidence of similar widespread behavioral market 
failures in both sectors. Second, the aggregate monetary harm from anti-
competitive pricing in the consumer goods sector may be large, potentially 
even larger than in consumer finance. Finally, regulators cannot effectively 
monitor the consumer goods sector’s anticompetitive practices based on 
publicly available information. Like in finance, it is crucial that regulators 
understand how firms operate on the inside.  
The empirical evidence suggests the two sectors exhibit similar—and 
similarly widespread—behavioral market failures. The consumer protection 
literature has largely ignored these similarities. Legal scholars have occa-
sionally referenced well-established anticompetitive practices for a particular 
good, such as lowering the price of printers and increasing the price of ink 
cartridges, as a rhetorical device to illustrate analogous practices in contrac-
tual products.9 But consumer goods are typically mentioned by legal 
scholars alongside other products only to contrast their simplicity with more 
complex contract-driven products needing regulation.10 
 
Markovits%20-%20Snowballing%20Inequality.pdf (referencing Walmart as an example of a retail 
economy serving demand stemming from income inequality). 
9 See Oren Bar-Gill, Bundling and Consumer Misperception, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 33, 38-39, 46-
52 (2006) (discussing printers and ink cartridges as a preliminary example of product bundling to 
set up the main discussion of how such anticompetitive practices operate in three contractual 
products—health club memberships, credit cards, and cell phone subscriptions).  
10 See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 242, 250 (2008) (“The 
invisible hand works best when products are simple and purchased frequently. . . . [N]udging 
makes more sense for mortgages than for soft drinks.”); Richard A. Epstein, The Role of Accredita-
tion Commissions in Higher Education: The Troublesome Case of Dana College, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 83, 
83 (2012) (“One of the standard results of modern economic theory is that it is far easier for 
consumers to obtain reliable information about goods than it is about services.”); Elizabeth 
Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth: Fulfilling the 
Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 211 (2008) (arguing that credit transactions 
have more variables and are therefore more difficult to price than food products); J. Thomas 
Rosch, Comm’r, FTC, Managing Irrationality: Some Observations on Behavioral Economics and 
the Creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, Remarks at the Conference on the 
Regulation of Consumer Financial Products 6-7 (Jan. 6, 2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/managing-irrationality-some-
observations-behavioral-economics-and-creation-consumer-financial/100106financial-products.pdf 
(asserting that only more complex products are likely in need of protection from information 
asymmetries).  
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This perception of simplicity is important because it can determine 
regulatory outcomes. A financial product’s complexity is commonly seen as 
a key enabler of irrational decisionmaking.11 An irrational decision is one 
that does not advance the consumer’s objectives as well as an alternative 
choice; it may result from cognitive limitations such as overweighting short-
term, teaser rates in a contract or incorrectly calculating costs.12 Complexity 
increases the likelihood of irrational decisionmaking because consumers 
must process more information, causing them to use mental shortcuts and 
raising the costs of information acquisition. Importantly, consumer protec-
tion scholars and regulators can typically identify complexity in terms of 
individual products—such as the length of the contract or the many calcula-
tions needed to determine the total price.13 They are thus largely able to 
identify products in need of greater regulatory attention by analyzing only 
the product. 
Applying the same product-centric analysis to goods can erroneously 
create the impression of simplicity. A growing percentage of individual 
technological goods arguably have inherent complexity comparable to that 
of contractual financial products, but most—such as a jar of peanut butter—
do not.14 Instead, most of the complexity in consumer goods shopping can 
be seen by looking at the broader decisionmaking context rather than the 
product. For example, economists have found that online sellers can make 
shopping for individual products complex by lengthening descriptions and 
making it difficult to quickly assess the full costs of an item among numerous 
choices.15  
Shopping in large retail stores also involves complexity. For example, 
between 1975 and 2008, the number of products in the average supermarket 
 
11 See BAR-GILL, supra note 5, at 117 (finding complexity of subprime contracts enabled poor 
consumer decisionmaking). 
12 See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1471, 1477 (1998) (arguing that consumers often make suboptimal decisions as a result of 
cognitive limitations).  
13 See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 6, at 12 (discussing “the complexity of the average 
credit card contract and the legalistic language used in this contract”). 
14 But see Jerry Hirsch, Objects in Store Are Smaller than They Appear, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 9, 
2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/09/business/fi-shrink9, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
E3YT-E4E8 (reporting on how Skippy redesigned its peanut butter containers to have an 
indented bottom, thus reducing volume from 18 to 16.3 ounces, amounting to a visually impercep-
tible 10% increase in price). 
15 See generally Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities 
on the Internet, 77 ECONOMETRICA 427 (2009) (presenting evidence that online sellers engage in 
practices that complicate consumer choices). 
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increased from 8948 to 47,000.16 Whereas stores previously sold only one 
version of Crest toothpaste, supermarkets typically carry twenty-seven 
varieties of Crest alone.17 While this innovation and scale have brought 
many benefits to consumers, a growing body of research suggests that the 
resulting complexity causes consumers to rely on mental shortcuts in 
making decisions.18 In deciding whether one store has better prices than 
another store, for example, consumers rely on prices of only a small number 
of highly salient items—often only three to five.19 Non-salient items are not 
factored into a consumer’s decision of where to shop as much as they should 
be, and thus consumers may irrationally err in concluding which store will 
save them money. Part of the problem is that once in a given store, consumers 
can be made to pay higher prices on the non-salient items, which are 
perceived in accordance with their overall image of the store as “low-cost.”20  
It is worth noting that mass retailers can capitalize on decisionmaking 
complexity in ways that are surprisingly similar to those strategies 
employed by financial institutions. Professor Russell Korobkin, in building 
the case for contractual behavioral market failures, has argued that contracts 
have many product attributes that include various price- and nonprice-
related clauses.21 Overall contractual complexity causes consumers to pay 
less attention to non-salient clauses, such as late fees.22 This inattention 
makes consumers vulnerable to irrationally underweighting non-salient 
clauses in deciding among contracts, leading to higher costs on the non-
salient clauses than would be expected if consumers actually paid attention 
to and compared those clauses.23 The non-salient clauses in a complex 
 
16 See The Downside of Too Many Product Choices on Store Shelves, CONSUMER REP. (Jan. 2014), 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2014/03/too-many-product-choices-in-supermarkets/ 
index.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/WZ4T-B66K. 
17 See id. 
18 See, e.g., Ryan Hamilton & Alexander Chernev, Low Prices Are Just the Beginning: Price 
Image in Retail Management, J. MARKETING, Nov. 2013, at 1, 1 (explaining how consumers use 
“store-level price impressions” to decide where to shop and what to buy instead of always 
searching for the lowest price); see also Barr et al., supra note 7, at 27 (“[T]he addition of options 
can complicate (and, thus, ‘worsen’) the decision outcome . . . .”). 
19 Hamilton & Chernev, supra note 18, at 4. 
20 See id. (explaining how retailers use “known value items” to create a lower price image, 
which allows them to charge more for other items). 
21 See Korobkin, supra note 3, at 1206 (asserting that terms in contracts are attributes of the 
product just like the product’s price and physical characteristics, and that due to bounded 
rationality, “when making purchasing decisions [consumers] take into account only a limited 
number of product attributes and ignore others”). 
22 See id. at 1206-07, 1244-45. 
23 BAR-GILL, supra note 5, at 21 (“Non-salient price dimensions and prices that impose 
underestimated costs create opportunities for sellers to reduce the perceived total price of their 
product.”). 
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contract are—from a psychological decisionmaking perspective—analogous 
to the non-salient items in a basket of goods at a mass retailer.  
In short, when faced with the question of whether there is a behavioral 
market failure, policy designers should look to the empirical evidence on 
decisionmaking, not, as has often been the case, to a qualitative—indeed, in 
some sense impressionistic—assessment of individual products. The 
existing empirical evidence indicates that—like in consumer finance—
decisionmaking in goods is sufficiently complex to facilitate widespread 
anticompetitive pricing.24 In both sectors, making the best choice exceeds 
the mental processing ability of consumers, making it important for firms to 
exploit those limitations to remain in business.25 
Second, this anticompetitive pricing in goods may harm consumers 
significantly—and maybe in the aggregate even more than in financial 
services. Consumers spend four times more on goods than they do on 
financial services.26 Scholars have documented anticompetitive practices in a 
piecemeal manner for a diverse array of products and retailers. Economists 
have also quantified the effects to provide a sense of the aggregate costs to 
consumers. Even in the most seemingly consumer-friendly venue—online 
shopping, where comparison information is just a click away—retailers have 
been found to increase prices by 6% to 9% solely by hiding costs and making 
product descriptions more complicated.27 Economists have also concluded 
consumers pay more overall when sellers shift costs to add-on items that 
consumers irrationally ignore, such as charging high prices for printer ink or 
replacement heads of electric toothbrushes. Indeed, over the lifetime of a 
 
24 See infra subsection II.A.1. 
25 This imperative results from the fact that a firm not exploiting such decisionmaking limitations 
would earn less without necessarily getting credit from consumers for their lower prices. See 
generally Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information 
Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505 (2006) (explaining that once sophisticated 
consumers find out that they have a choice between a lower-priced product with expensive add-ons 
and a higher-priced product with cheaper add-ons, they purchase the lower-priced base product 
and choose to forgo the add-ons). 
26 See National Data, supra note 1, at tbls.2.1 & 2.4.5. The total for consumer finance is 
attained by summing “Financial services” from Table 2.4.5 and “Personal interest payments” from 
Table 2.1, which total $745 billion.  
27 See, e.g., Ellison & Ellison, supra note 15, at 428-29 (“Given the extreme price sensitivity of 
the demand for low-quality products, a naive application of single-good markup rules would 
suggest that equilibrium price-cost margins might be just 3% to 6%. We find that the average 
markup . . . is about 12%.”).  
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product the price paid for the original product is often only a fraction of the 
cost of the largely ignored add-on items.28  
Legal scholars have built on these and other narrow studies to begin to 
paint a larger picture of market failures in the goods sector. In a seminal 
piece, Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar identified the potential for grocery 
stores, gasoline stations, and cigarette manufacturers to manipulate consumer 
purchases using behavioral biases.29 Ryan Calo extended the Hanson and 
Kysar analysis by looking at how firms of all kinds—including those providing 
services—leverage digital technologies to manipulate consumers.30 However, 
in part because their policy focus was largely elsewhere—such as on tort 
liability and privacy—Hanson, Kysar, and Calo did not examine the economic 
literature quantifying overcharge to consumers.  
This Article offers a more comprehensive treatment of the ways in 
which online and in-store sellers of goods engage in anticompetitive 
practices but focuses on the harm of higher prices paid by consumers.31 A 
sense of the aggregate overcharge paid in the goods sector is especially 
important because the nature of the harm is not very salient. In financial 
services, people may lose their homes due to predatory lending. Or they 
may pay infuriating credit card or bank account fees listed as separate line 
items on their bills. By contrast, shoppers may never even realize that they 
were harmed by paying more for goods than they would have had the 
market been governed by more informed and rational consumers. Nonetheless, 
as discussed below, empirical data suggest that higher prices paid may 
amount to hundreds of dollars or more annually and tens of thousands of 
dollars over a consumer’s lifetime.32  
The sector’s complexity and harm combine with a third challenge to 
round out the picture of regulatory inadequacy: problematic practices 
cannot be practically examined based on publically available information. As 
their operations become increasingly technological and scientific, sellers of 
goods become increasingly sophisticated at altering consumers’ decisionmaking 
 
28 See, e.g., Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 25, at 506 (“Printer manufacturers advertise the low 
price of their ink-jet printers, but do not compete on the principal cost of ownership: patented ink 
cartridges that cost ten times more than the printer itself over the life of the product.”). 
29 See generally Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evi-
dence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999) (exploring in great detail the 
interaction between companies and consumer psychology in the three contexts). 
30 See generally Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014) 
(discussing the way technology affects the “mediated consumer,” who approaches the marketplace 
through the lens of technology). 
31 See infra Part II. 
32 See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 1 (showing average annual expendi-
tures divided into categories of goods and services consumed); see also infra Section III.A. 
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context.33 And as firms become larger, they can make meaningful profits by 
investing in developing ever more minor and subtle practices that may only 
amount to pennies on any given transaction. More sophisticated practices 
with more subtle harms are necessarily more difficult for regulators to 
observe externally.  
Behavioral law and economics scholars have generally recognized that 
financial firms’ growth in technological capabilities and increasing focus on 
decision science contribute to irrational consumer decisions.34 However, the 
topic typically receives passing treatment in the literature.35 Nor has there 
been discussion in the consumer protection literature of how that evolving 
sophistication makes it more difficult for regulators to identify market 
failures through publicly available information.  
This omission is likely influenced by the fact that with financial prod-
ucts, much of the complexity and behavioral pricing that firms execute is 
observable within the four corners of the contract. Thus, monitoring the 
growing complexity of individual products has served as a proxy for examining 
 
33 Market failures of this sort are thus heavily dependent on context, including the size of the 
sophistication gap between firms and consumers. See Barr et al., supra note 7, at 26, 31, 33 
(“Human behavior turns out to be heavily context dependent, a function of both the person and 
the situation. . . . The substantial influence of context on behavior naturally implies that institu-
tions will come to play a central role in shaping how people think and what they do. . . . Because 
people are fallible and easily misled, transparency does not always pay off and firms sometimes 
have strong incentives to exacerbate psychological biases . . . .”); Robert J. MacCoun, The Relativity 
of Judgment as a Challenge for Behavioral Law and Economics, 2 DAITO BUNKA U. L. REV. 29, 30 
(2006) (acknowledging the difficulty in current behavioral law and economics of choosing the best 
reference point by which to measure economic or psychological models). 
34 See, e.g., BAR-GILL, supra note 5, at 90 (noting that the design features of credit cards 
capitalize on consumer misperceptions); Willis, supra note 3, at 719-20, 807-08 (discussing how 
advances in computing capacity enable lenders to model borrower behavior by leveraging millions 
of data points). 
35 See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 6, at 46 (exploring “seller behavior” in terms of 
“how sellers design their credit products. . . . to exploit consumers’ imperfect information and 
imperfect rationality”); Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails 
and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1648-49, 1653-57 (2014) (giving limited attention to the topic of 
how firms are adept at adjusting to any proposed regulatory interventions that might make 
consumers more rational). Professor Bar-Gill in his seminal book on the topic, Seduction by 
Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in Consumer Markets, quotes an industry executive as 
saying that firms have brought the study of consumer transactions and psychology to a level of 
scientific precision. See BAR-GILL, supra note 5, at 108 (“No other industry in the world knows 
consumers and their transaction behavior better than the bank card industry. It has turned the 
analysis of consumers into a science rivaling the studies of DNA.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). But this paragraph comes in the section on how to design information disclosures for 
consumers, not to explain the problem. The book otherwise devotes limited if any attention to the 
internal operations of firms except as can be seen from product design. This is likely due to the 
difficulty of obtaining any information about the internal operations of private firms compared to 
the ease of observing the features of a product.  
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firms’ increasing sophistication at exploiting consumer irrationality and 
information asymmetries. 
However, product complexity is insufficient as a proxy for firm sophisti-
cation in consumer goods. Mass retailers continually fine-tune their pricing 
algorithms through advanced behavioral data-mining operations. They film 
customers’ in-store movements, compile loyalty card data, and conduct 
many randomized controlled trials that easily provide statistical significance 
across thousands of stores and millions of transactions.36 They can test 
whether unnecessarily confusing product descriptions, rebate offers, 
discount pricing, product bundling, price label designs, hidden costs, and 
other changes cause a fraction of consumers to pay even a few cents more on 
a fraction of purchases.  
 Whether firms succeed in moving consumers away from rational choices 
that would advance consumers’ “true preferences” and toward irrational 
choices that advance firms’ preferences is an empirical question. Non-field 
experiments demonstrating consumer irrationality in thinking about a 
purchase are generally insufficient to infer that the same irrationality 
happens in actual markets.37 Consequently, as Alan Schwartz has argued, 
and as regulators have implicitly concluded, regulation is unwarranted 
absent evidence of irrationality in real-life commercial settings.38 Yet 
because only retailers currently hold the keys to such consumer goods field 
experiments and closely guard their experimental findings as trade secrets, 
they essentially have knowledge monopolies that leave regulators without a 
strong foundation for regulatory decisions.39 The main federal regulator of 
 
36 See Jayne O’Donnell & Sarah Meehan, Retailers Want to Read Your Mind, USA TODAY, 
Mar. 2, 2012, at 1B (describing retailers’ use of consumer data).  
37 See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1058 (2000) (“Before such 
legal reform proposals will be taken seriously outside the academy, legal scholars will have to 
develop tangible evidence that commercial actors in commercial settings are likely to respond to 
incentives in the same way as do student subjects.”); Schwartz, supra note 5 (manuscript at 9) 
(“There is a temptation to believe that consumers exhibit the same biases in markets as subjects 
exhibited in the laboratory because they are all just people. There are two reasons to resist this 
temptation. First, some subjects do not make mistakes in the lab, which suggests that some 
consumers do not make mistakes in the market. . . . Second, many biases moderate or vanish with 
experience.”). This argument is supported by studies attempting to replicate laboratory studies 
about consumer goods decisionmaking in the field. See, e.g., Koert van Ittersum et al., Smart 
Shopping Carts: How Real-Time Feedback Influences Spending, J. MARKETING, Nov. 2013, at 21, 31 
(finding results in a third field experiment were weakened compared to two related laboratory 
experiments, and stating that such weakening is normal for field studies compared to lab studies). 
38 See Schwartz, supra note 5 (manuscript at 13) (arguing that when facts about actual con-
sumer behavior are unavailable, regulators should assume bias did not affect contracting choice).  
39 Private control of information needed by consumers also contributed to the subprime 
mortgage crisis. See Joseph William Singer, Foreclosure and the Failures of Formality, or Subprime 
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consumer goods—the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—currently relies 
mostly on publicly available information and consumer complaints in 
deciding whether to launch a consumer protection legal investigation.40 
The central policy recommendation in this Article is that the FTC put 
an end to this empirical–information monopoly by developing a supervision 
program. Supervision programs such as that used by the Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau (CFPB) are staffed by non-lawyer examiners, who 
regularly collect firms’ internal data outside of any legal investigation.41 For 
example, the FTC would be able to look at the results of retailers’ field 
experiments and, when necessary, facilitate parallel field experiments that 
determine whether firms’ practices are capitalizing on consumer irrationality. 
Enacting a tailored supervision program would provide a crucial, empirical 
foundation for behavioral regulatory decisionmaking that Professor Schwartz 
and other legal scholars have identified as missing.42  
The three supporting premises underlying the case for reform are 
covered in Parts I through IV. Part I outlines the nature of the harm to 
consumers and expands on the growing sophistication gap between consumers 
and firms. Part II discusses evidence of widespread anticompetitive pricing 
practices in the consumer goods sector, and the consumer limitations, 
market complexity, and institutional sophistication that make such practices 
possible. It notes the similar behavioral market failures in the goods and 
finance sectors. Part III adds to the literature an aggregate analysis of the 
harm to consumers and society from such practices. This analysis involves 
applying the behavioral economics studies on overcharge to consumers’ 
aggregate expenditure figures.  
 
Mortgage Conundrums and How to Fix Them, 46 CONN. L. REV. 497, 530 (2013) (“[H]omeowners 
seeking to renegotiate their mortgages could not do so when [Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems (MERS)] would not tell them who owned the mortgage. MERS would only tell them the 
name of the loan servicer and loan servicers often had incentives to foreclose rather than 
renegotiate.”). 
40 Other sources of information include complaints from competitors and other information 
submitted voluntarily by companies.  
41 Examiners may have any number of professional backgrounds, including as lawyers, but are 
not acting as lawyers in their capacity as examiners.  
42 See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 37, at 1058 (“Before such legal reform proposals will be 
taken seriously outside the academy, legal scholars will have to develop tangible evidence that 
commercial actors in commercial settings are likely to respond to incentives in the same way as do 
student subjects.”); Schwartz, supra note 5 (manuscript at 6) (“[T]he regulator today needs new 
types of evidence, and new default normative premises when evidence is lacking, in order to 
intervene effectively in markets in which some consumers are making cognitive mistakes while 
others are not.”); Willis, supra note 3, at 832 (“Only by examining the evidence on the ground 
closely can we know whether procedural ‘framing’ or substantive ‘choice narrowing’ regulation—
or . . . some combination of both—is likely to reduce the incidence of a social problem.”). 
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Part IV details how the current consumer protection institutional 
framework—including courts, legislatures, and agencies—is inadequate to 
respond appropriately. However, federal regulators have the legal power to 
collect information from companies and to act on what they learn. Based on 
these discussions, I propose in Part V a new regulatory approach built on 
supervising institutions. I also discuss the potential for mandated disclo-
sures in goods. In particular, it may be possible to empower third-party 
technological intermediaries to do what they currently cannot: compare 
pricing information across online and brick-and-mortar stores, thus helping 
consumers to rationally select the best deals.  
To be clear, I am not proposing a full-blown supervisory program akin to 
that in finance, in which the nation’s largest banks host teams of regulatory 
examiners year-round. Any consumer goods supervision program would 
need to be tailored to the sector, which might mean a lighter model relying 
on remote monitoring of firms by requesting specific, easily transmittable 
information. Nor am I arguing that all identifiable anticompetitive practices 
should be regulated. Such a decision would require an in-depth institutional 
analysis of the benefits and costs of intervention.  
Rather, the core claim of this Article is that the preliminary evidence 
suggests consumers overpay for goods by significant amounts at great cost 
to society. Faced with such evidence, regulators of goods should respond as 
have regulators of financial products: by first understanding what is going 
on. Congress gave the FTC the information-collection power to do so. 
Exercising that power would give the agency a better chance to make 
informed decisions in the face of a fast-moving, complex sector driven by 
highly sophisticated institutions.  
 I. THE SOPHISTICATION GAP BETWEEN FIRMS  
AND CONSUMERS IS LARGE 
Economists agree that firms generally aim to find ways to profit from 
consumer irrationality and information asymmetries.43 Large retailers are no 
exception. Like large financial institutions, they rationally invest in developing 
practices that confuse, redirect, or otherwise take advantage of consumers’ 
 
43 See Glenn Ellison, Bounded Rationality in Industrial Organization (“In the recent psychology 
and economics–motivated literature, the rational firm–irrational consumer assumption has become 
the norm, and the question of what firms do to exploit irrationality is often the primary focus.”), in 
2 ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, NINTH 
WORLD CONGRESS 142, 147 (Richard Blundell et al. eds., 2006).  
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limited time and information-processing capacity.44 Whether any given 
practice merits regulatory action would require a full normative and institu-
tional analysis. Still, as a first step, legal decisionmakers must understand 
that today’s retailers are not just large versions of the mom-and-pop hardware 
store of the past: they are data-driven, psychologically informed institutions 
that systematically tailor prices and products to consumers’ shopping 
shortcomings.  
A. Defining Harm 
Competitive markets offer great promise to contribute to societal welfare. 
The Supreme Court articulated one vision of this promise when it said, “the 
unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation 
of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the 
greatest material progress.”45 Indeed, competitive forces in the twentieth 
century pushed down prices on goods such as food and refrigerators, likely 
reducing the hardship of poverty.46 
At the same time, it is widely recognized that, left completely unregulated, 
businesses may contribute to market failures that undermine society’s 
interests.47 This is largely why antitrust authorities restrain mergers that 
would create too much market power; such power can and rationally would 
be used in ways that undermine competition, harming consumer interests 
and social welfare.  
Similarly, economists have long believed that for markets to be fully 
competitive, consumers must make informed and rational decisions.48 FTC 
commissioners appointed during the deregulatory Reagan administration 
described the agency’s mission as being “to intervene only where market 
imperfections keep individual consumers from effectively making their own 
purchase decisions from among a full range of options.”49 Informed 
consumers would, among other things, have adequate information about 
 
44 See, e.g., Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 25, at 506-07 (offering a model for how firms gain 
profit by obfuscating information). 
45 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).  
46 See Markovits, supra note 8 (manuscript at 16, 20, 26).  
47 See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 11-13 (6th ed. 2012) (explaining 
the general importance of regulation for well-functioning markets); ROBERT PITOFSKY, 
HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID & DIANE P. WOOD, TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 
2 (6th ed. 2010) (noting that there is “a widely shared view that private interests operating in free 
markets, and unchecked by effective government antitrust rules, will harm efficiency and consumer 
welfare”). 
48 For some qualifications to this simplified statement, see infra Section I.B. 
49 Neil W. Averitt & Terry Calvani, The Role of the FTC in American Society, 39 OKLA. L. 
REV. 39, 40 (1986). 
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what products and prices are available to them in the market. And once they 
had such information, rational consumers would systematically make 
decisions that advanced their objectives—such as lowest price, highest 
quality, favorite brand, least time spent, or some prioritized combination of 
factors.  
Informed and rational consumer decisions would motivate consumer 
companies to produce and price their goods in a way that best satisfies 
consumers’ interests. Firms that satisfy consumers’ preferences would be 
rewarded with sales, and those that do not would go out of business. This 
competitive process drives prices in commodity markets toward their 
marginal cost of production or the costs of producing one additional item.50  
However, competitive pricing breaks down in the face of information 
asymmetries and consumer irrationality. Assuming consumers seek a low 
price, if they are too poorly informed of the prices available in the market or 
are unable to process information so as to determine which products are 
priced best, firms have less incentive to compete on price. A firm in such a 
market might not attract significant additional sales by lowering prices 
because consumers would not appreciate the difference. Economic theory 
and empirics suggest that this failed market would have higher-priced goods 
than a fully competitive market filled with rational and informed consumers.51  
In this Article, I deploy an informal and intuitive conception of harm, 
under which behavioral economics–related market failures harm consumers 
by reducing consumer surplus to below the levels that would exist if 
consumers made rational and informed decisions. The behavioral effects can 
produce this result both by allowing producers to charge higher prices and 
by influencing the quality, quantity, and variety of goods that producers sell 
into patterns that do not best suit consumers’ interests.  
B. Limits on Consumer Sophistication 
Evaluating consumers’ susceptibility to making irrational and uninformed 
decisions is thus central to determining harm. The empirical literature 
suggests consumers are highly susceptible to such harm. Furthermore, 
 
50 This marginal cost allows for a competitive return on investment. 
51 See Jennifer Brown et al., Shrouded Attributes and Information Suppression: Evidence from the 
Field, 125 Q.J. ECON. 859, 869 (2010) (finding that, when shipping charges are hidden, increasing 
shipping charges significantly increases revenues); Ellison & Ellison, supra note 15, at 428 (finding 
that obfuscating online product descriptions increases profits); Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 25, at 
506-07 (showing that firms are able to charge a higher price to “uninformed myopic consumers” 
and have no incentive to educate those consumers). 
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consumer-oriented information technologies have ultimately proved 
inadequate to protect consumers.  
Even fully rational consumers may not make purchases that best advance 
their interests if they are unaware of better alternatives.52 One obstacle to 
obtaining such information in the goods sector is the time needed to acquire 
information relative to the benefits. Consumers are more likely to invest 
time researching prices for bigger-ticket items such as computers or cars 
than for the vast majority of lower-priced consumer goods. The high cost of 
acquiring information on hundreds of mass retail items among thousands of 
choices across different stores leads most consumers to make decisions with 
limited comparative information.53 
Consumers are also susceptible to systematic mistakes because of 
shortcomings in how they process whatever information they do have.54 For 
example, consumers have limited computational skills, attention, and 
memory.55 Remembering prices for hundreds of items changing across time 
and locations is a task beyond most consumers. And even if consumers 
could remember all of the prices, calculating the best configuration of 
shopping in terms of which items to buy where, factoring in transportation 
time and costs, would stretch most consumers’ mental computation skills. 
Psychologists have found that in the face of these limitations, a large 
amount of decisionmaking happens in a quick manner largely unobserved 
by the individual, which requires use of mental heuristics or shortcuts.56  
Retailers study these decisionmaking limits closely.57 As one former senior 
marketing executive of a multinational goods company describes it, “[t]he 
core benefit of modern decision science is to provide an analytical, systematic 
 
52 See Steven C. Salop & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Bargain and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically 
Competitive Price Dispersion, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 493, 493-94 (1977) (concluding that infor-
mation costs lead to prices above perfect competition). 
53 See generally Hamilton & Chernev, supra note 18 (explaining that research indicates consumer 
decisions are influenced both by actual prices and a retailer’s price image).  
54 Id. 
55 See Barr et al., supra note 7, at 31 (“The amount of information people attend to is 
limited . . . .”); Jolls et al., supra note 12, at 1477 (noting humans’ “limited computational skills and 
seriously flawed memories”). 
56 See Jolls et al., supra note 12, at 1477 (“To deal with limited brain power and time we use 
mental shortcuts and rules of thumb.”). See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST 
AND SLOW 109-95 (2011) (showing the various heuristics and biases people resort to in the face of 
complex problems). 
57 See, e.g., PHIL BARDEN, DECODED: THE SCIENCE BEHIND WHY WE BUY 15 (2013) 
(explaining the limited amount of time a consumer will spend processing advertising media). 
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access to the autopilot system and, hence, to the implicit level of purchase 
decision making.”58  
This insight enables retailers to alter perceptions of price by leveraging 
an array of biases. For example, consumers are highly influenced by numerical 
anchoring, or being exposed to an initial reference point for the price of an 
item. In one study, consumers who were briefly exposed to an ad for a $799 
television, even though they viewed the price as excessive and more than 
twice as high as they thought the television was worth, subsequently 
thought a price of $319 for the same television was 31% more valuable than 
those who had not been exposed to such an ad.59  
Also, the way a retailer presents a price can greatly influence a consumer’s 
purchase decision. Consumers are far more likely to buy items ending in the 
digit “9” than those ending in other numbers. For example, in one study 
consumers purchased more of the same clothing item at $39 than at lower 
prices ranging from $34 to $38, or than at higher prices ranging from $41 to 
$44.60 Although a cost–benefit analysis would likely weigh against regulating 
the practices in either of these examples, they demonstrate the ease with 
which consumers may make irrational decisions in response to seller 
behavior.  
Technological tools can enhance a consumer’s overall shopping sophistication 
and offer a potential solution to information and rationality shortcomings. There 
is little doubt that technologies have enabled consumers to acquire infor-
mation about products more easily and to purchase more conveniently, and 
online retailers have increased price pressure on brick-and-mortar retailers 
and thus in some instances moved markets closer to competitive pricing.61 
However, from a regulatory perspective, whether the Internet has helped 
consumers and decreased some retailers’ market power is irrelevant.  
The central question is whether consumers are generally able to make 
informed and rational decisions in consumer markets given the information 
technology tools available to them and to sellers. This is an empirical 
question, and the evidence suggests that whatever help information 
 
58 See id. at 27; see also WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRICELESS: THE MYTH OF FAIR VALUE 
(AND HOW TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT) 16 (2010) (quoting Columbia University’s Eric 
Johnson’s statement that marketers who have been “in the field awhile . . . realize, yes, [they] can 
manipulate consumers”). 
59 See Joel E. Urbany et al., The Effect of Plausible and Exaggerated Reference Prices on Consumer 
Perceptions and Price Search, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 95, 100-02 (1988). 
60 BARDEN, supra note 57, at 50-51. 
61 See Alistair Barr, EBay, PayPal Pinpoint Stores for Mobile Shopping, USA TODAY (Dec. 5, 
2013, 4:07 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2013/12/05/ebay-paypal-stores-mobile/3871057, 
archived at http://perma.cc/4D3J-972A.  
  
2015] Helping Buyers Beware 1329 
 
technologies have provided to consumers has been insufficient to correct 
market failures related to decisionmaking. As two leading economists put it, 
the Internet “was to usher in the New Economy, but we seem mostly to 
have the Old.”62  
Technological intermediaries have mainly disappointed in failing to offer 
a more price-competitive online market. Economists have found that the 
online market has not offered the broadly competitive prices that were 
initially expected.63 Retailers employ a number of techniques making it 
more difficult to compare products online, ranging from creating more 
complicated product descriptions64 to offering multiple versions of essen-
tially the same products65 to paying for user comments.66 And searching for 
products online brings complexity and time-consuming comparisons of its 
own, producing thousands of search results for a single product in a single 
online retailer. Consequently, consumers are susceptible to irrational 
decisionmaking and cognitive biases online.67 Indeed, in some respects 
retailers have even more tools to undermine rational decisionmaking online, 
given that consumers have different cognitive biases and online retailers can 
 
62 Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, Lessons About Markets from the Internet, J. ECON. 
PERSP., Spring 2005, at 139, 139. 
63 See id. at 151 (“[P]rice-cost margins on the Internet are not extremely low.”). See generally 
Xing Pan et al., Price Dispersion on the Internet: A Review and Directions for Future Research, J. 
INTERACTIVE MARKETING, Autumn 2004, at 116 (reviewing literature suggesting similar price 
dispersion online and offline). 
64 Ellison & Ellison, supra note 15, at 428. 
65 Id.; see also Elizabeth A. Harris, The Social Showroom: Retailers Seek Online Partners to Put 
Products Out Where People Can See Them, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2013, at B1 (noting that retailers 
“swapped out bar codes to make them incompatible with their competitors”). 
66 See Mike Elgan, Weeding Out Fake Reviews Online Takes Care, Incentive, PCWORLD (Oct. 
26, 2013, 2:05 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2057939/weeding-out-fake-reviews-online-
takes-care-incentive.html, archived at http://perma.cc/LV8D-F4UW (explaining that companies 
pay for writers to post positive comments about their products and criticisms of their competi-
tors). Some states have begun to crack down on paid reviews. See David Streitfeld, Give Yourself 5 
Stars? Online, It Might Cost You, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2013, at A1 (reporting that New York 
regulators were issuing fines to companies that created deceptive reviews on the Internet). Online 
shoppers place great weight on user reviews, with a recent survey determining that 70% of 
consumers trust online reviews. Consumer Trust in Online, Social And Mobile Advertising Grows, 
NIELSEN (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2012/consumer-trust-in-
online-social-and-mobile-advertising-grows.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9VJM-ZQYA.  
67 As an example of how susceptible consumers may be to online retailers exploiting cogni-
tive biases, in one experiment, the choice of pennies rather than clouds as the website background 
design caused consumers to focus on price rather than quality in their decisionmaking and caused 
subjects to choose the cheaper sofa 56% rather than 39% of the time. POUNDSTONE, supra note 
58, at 280-81. 
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more easily tailor the shopping experience based on previous browsing and 
purchasing history.68  
The second way in which technologies have failed to live up to their 
potential is in their ability to enable consumers to gather and analyze all 
market prices available. To see the theoretical potential for this to happen, 
consider a shopping application in which consumers input location, means 
of transportation, and a shopping list. The application would aggregate 
prices from all relevant brick-and-mortar and online retailers and run 
sophisticated algorithms to create optimized shopping itineraries from 
which the consumer could choose.69 Importantly, the application would be 
immune from irrational decisions such as being more likely to purchase a 
product ending in “9” and being influenced by exposure to an advertisement 
for an overpriced $799 television. It would be able to determine rationally 
which retailer had the best price on like items.  
A number of existing personal shopping applications attempt to do this 
but fall short because retailers have an information monopoly about prices 
and items sold in their stores. Because retailers typically refuse to disclose 
such information, the applications must rely on highly ineffective alterna-
tives such as consumer scanning of items in-store.70 Consequently, while the 
applications do improve comparison shopping by showing online prices or a 
handful of local prices, most purchasing options are left out of the applica-
tions’ algorithms. This may yet change—Google, most recently, is piloting a 
different delivery service in which it enables consumers to browse product 
information from local stores.71 But no application currently enables a 
consumer to gather local and online pricing data and compare all options 
available. As a result, current information technologies are unhelpful for 
most items and are only partially helpful for the largest items.  
 
68 See Calo, supra note 30, at 1015-16 (discussing how companies are tracking web users’ activity 
online to provide personalized, targeted advertisements). 
69 It might, for example, recommend going to two specific stores and list the items to 
purchase at each store along with the total time and costs. The application would easily be able to 
offer multiple itineraries and adjust for consumer sensitivity to considerations such as time and 
money. 
70 Because prices and products change so rapidly, and so few consumers are willing to spend 
the time to upload such information for the majority of products, this tends to leave out most 
items available in any given location and raises the possibility of the pricing information listed 
being outdated. 
71 Dan Adams, Google Express Set to Launch Deliveries in Boston Area, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 14, 
2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/10/13/google-express-same-day-delivery-service-
launches-boston-area/pkqltUr5V96c1Wv8v2xukM/story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/UU9B-
HBG9.  
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Thus, overall, consumers have low retail shopping sophistication. They 
have insufficient information due to the high costs of acquisition relative to 
the benefit, are subject to decisionmaking biases, and lack adequate 
technological tools. 
C. Sophisticated Institutions Capitalize on Consumer Limitations 
While consumers are boundedly rational, sellers have moved ever closer 
to the pinnacle of rationality: scientific decisionmaking. The nexus of this 
sophistication is the transformation of stores into laboratories of mass 
experimentation. This Section discusses how two main factors have made 
this transformation possible: technology and scale.72  
In recent years, firms have invested hundreds of millions of dollars to 
build information technologies that enable them to collect and mine data 
from billions of transactions—online and offline, loyalty card and 
otherwise.73 They have also generated their own observational insights into 
customer behavior. They film consumers’ in-store movements and install 
cameras that track the movement of consumers’ eyes as they walk down the 
aisles.74 Marketers combine these various data sources with the literature on 
decisionmaking to generate hypotheses about pricing practices that are then 
tested in stores.  
A new generation of employees supports these analytics. The former 
Chief Science Officer of Amazon notes that retailers have started an “arms 
race” to hire mathematicians and statisticians to analyze the results of in-
store experiments and to develop behavioral modeling algorithms from 
their troves of data.75 Nor are retailers—such as Dollar Tree, Target, CVS, 
Walmart, and Home Depot—alone in this effort. They are legally allowed 
to develop their pricing and sales strategies together with the Fortune 500 
 
72 See Stefan Biesdorf et al., Big Data: What’s Your Plan?, MCKINSEY Q., Mar. 2013, at 1, 2 
(discussing how to use advances in big data analytics to enhance productivity and profit). 
73 See JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXT 
FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY 6 (2011) (discussing the 
proliferation of big data and how it can be used to create value across sectors of the global 
economy). By contrast, in 1980, computers were just arriving in consumer goods companies, did 
not digitally collect data from stores, and were mostly used for internal financial tasks. See generally 
JUDITH A. QUILLARD ET AL., CTR. FOR INFO. SYS. RESEARCH, A STUDY OF THE 
CORPORATE USE OF PERSONAL COMPUTERS (1983) (looking at personal computer usage in 
ten corporations, including two Fortune 100 consumer goods companies). 
74 See O’Donnell & Meehan, supra note 36. 
75 See Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, (Magazine), at 30 
(discussing one statistician’s work for Target); Claire Cain Miller & Stephanie Clifford, To Catch 
Up, Walmart Moves to Amazon Turf, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2013, at 1 (mentioning Walmart’s pursuit 
of computer engineers to help the company use “big data” to compete in the e-commerce market).  
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companies that manufacture products, such as Procter & Gamble, Clorox, 
Pepsico, and Kellogg.76 These investments in technologies and people pay 
nicely: industry estimates have placed the potential operating margin 
increase for using big data analyses at more than 60%.77  
Some of these advanced analytics generate procompetitive insights that 
arguably benefit consumers, such as more relevant coupons on the backs of 
receipts. These insights may make it more feasible—and less costly—for 
sellers to inform consumers of goods they would want to purchase.  
However, some of the marginal increase comes from influencing consumers 
to purchase in ways that advance firms’—but not necessarily consumers’—
interests.78 Retailers track micro-behavioral patterns such as variations in 
consumers’ price sensitivity by item at different times in different stores 
and adjust prices accordingly.79 Online retailers also selectively charge 
consumers higher prices by, for example, profiling operating systems and 
tracking purchase history.80 Staples’s algorithm for online prices looks at the 
zip code to determine whether the consumer has other options nearby, 
which essentially enables the company to better pinpoint potential market 
failures relating to insufficient choice.81 The consulting firm McKinsey & 
Co. has disclosed that retailers use big data to “nudge customers to higher-
margin products.”82  
Knowing exactly how sellers use analytics to pinpoint behavioral pricing 
opportunities—rather than merely to price discriminate—is impossible 
because analytical findings are closely guarded as trade secrets by firms, and 
 
76 See Bradley J. Lorden, Note, Category Management: The Antitrust Implications in the United 
States and Europe, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 541, 543-44 (2011) (explaining that retailers 
delegate responsibility for certain product categories to leading manufacturers in the industry, who 
give information and advice based on consumer preferences in the product category).  
77 See MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 73, at 6. Of course, as mentioned above, not all of this 
profit is from supracompetitive pricing. 
78 See generally Duhigg, supra note 75, at 33 (“There is a calculus, it turns out, for mastering 
our subconscious urges. For companies like Target, the exhaustive rendering of our conscious and 
unconscious patterns into data sets and algorithms has revolutionized what they know about us 
and, therefore, how precisely they can sell.”). 
79 See Steve Lohr, The Age of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at 1 (“Retailers, like 
Walmart and Kohl’s, analyze sales, pricing and economic, demographic and weather data to tailor 
product selections at particular stores and determine the timing of price markdowns.”). 
80 See generally Aniko Hannak et al., Measuring Price Discrimination and Steering on E-
commerce Web Sites (2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ccs.neu.edu/home/ 
cbw/pdf/imc151-hannak.pdf (finding e-commerce websites use data about operating systems and 
purchasing history to engage in price discrimination and steer consumers to certain products). 
81 Jennifer Valentino-Devries et al., Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on Users’ Information, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2012, at A1. 
82 Biesdorf et al., supra note 72, at 7.  
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regulators do not currently collect such information.83 But the fact that big 
data analytics provide a powerful tool to raise prices to consumers is well 
known in the retail industry.84 And in a market filled with boundedly 
rational consumers, technology increasingly enables sellers to pinpoint 
opportunities to raise prices due to behavioral biases.85 
Firms’ scale is also an important enabler of this scientific and technologically 
driven decisionmaking. Leading retailers today have far more stores than in 
previous decades. In 1992, Walmart, then the leading retailer, had 1928 
stores. Today, it has over 11,000.86 Dollar General alone, which caters to low-
income shoppers, had 10,506 stores as of 2013.87 Its competitor Family 
Dollar, as well as numerous drug and corner stores such as Walgreens, CVS, 
and 7-11, each have over 7000.88 Retailers have also increased dramatically in 
terms of share of market and total items sold. In 2000, the ten largest 
grocery chains made up less than 30% of the market; by 2010, the ten largest 
accounted for 70%.89  
This scale helps retailers develop anticompetitive behavioral economics 
practices in two main ways. Most directly, the number of stores enables 
more experiments to be run in a small subset of stores with statistically 
significant sample sizes. For example, the way a price label is designed, such 
as whether a dollar sign is included, can influence how consumers view the 
actual price (prompting some states to regulate shelf labeling).90 Scale 
enables larger retailers to run a far greater number of experiments on such 
minor label variations and produce valid results more quickly than ever 
before at lower risk to the overall business.  
Retailer size is also important because it expands the number of behav-
ioral pricing practices that are profitable. It takes a similar level of investment 
 
83 For a discussion of regulatory reform that would examine such internal data, see infra Part V. 
84 Biesdorf et al., supra note 72, at 6-7; see also Duhigg, supra note 75, at 33 (“Almost every 
major retailer, from grocery chains to investment banks to the U.S. Postal Service, has a ‘predic-
tive analytics’ department devoted to understanding not just consumers’ shopping habits but also 
their personal habits, so as to more efficiently market to them.”). 
85 See infra Section II.A. 
86 See History Timeline, WALMART, http://corporate.walmart.com/our-story/history/history-
timeline (last visited Mar. 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2M3M-T4WB. 
87 Top 100 Retailers (2013), NAT’L RETAIL FED’N, https://nrf.com/resources/top-retailers-
list/top-100-retailers-2013 (last visited Mar. 21, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/634P-8JR2. 
88 Id. Walmart, at a mere 4570 stores in the United States, and Kroger, the nation’s largest 
grocery chain, at 3538 stores, are smaller in terms of stores but are the two largest retailers by 
annual sales at $467 billion and $92 billion respectively. Id. 
89 Niraj Dawar & Jason Stornelli, Rebuilding the Relationship Between Manufacturers and Retailers, 
MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Winter 2013, at 83, 84. 
90 See BARDEN, supra note 57, at 49-50 (discussing how retailers reduce perceived cost 
through various techniques). 
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in technology, and a similar number of employee hours, to collect and 
analyze data for a behavioral pricing practice whether the retailer has 1000 
stores or 10,000. If a retailer sells 100 million units of a product annually, an 
experiment that increases the price of that product on average by two cents 
will still generate $2 million annually in additional profit each year. A 
retailer of one-tenth the size would have a harder time justifying the same 
expenditures required to develop that practice, as it would earn only 
$200,000 annually from the same practice.91  
Mass retailers’ institutional sophistication is similar to that identified by 
legal scholars as a driver of financial institutions’ growing ability to exploit 
consumer limitations in recent decades. Professor Lauren Willis, for 
example, has discussed how increasing computing power in the 1990s gave 
lenders the means to design their credit products more creatively to capitalize 
on consumer behavior.92 Though lenders had always conducted analyses to 
model borrower behavior, they went from simpler, more subjective strategies 
to more advanced analyses such as through multivariate regression of 
millions of data points.93 Another way of characterizing Professor Willis’s 
account is that the lenders greatly increased their rationality relative to 
consumers. While consumer borrowers may have gained somewhat helpful 
new research capabilities from the Internet and spreadsheets, lenders gained 
powerful information processing tools that created enormous sophistication 
asymmetries in an already complex mortgage market.  
Similarly, over the past several decades, sellers of consumer goods have 
developed game-changing sophistication in an increasingly complex market. 
Consumers, by contrast, have gained helpful search technologies, but they 
have major limitations and the empirical literature consistently finds that 
sellers control these interfaces to exploit consumer decisionmaking limits. 
Thus, in the modern technological and scale-driven commercial landscape, 
the sophistication gap between buyers and sellers of goods is large and has 
grown considerably, as it has in financial products.  
 
91 This is a greatly simplified example; the difference in profits between the two firms may 
actually be greater given economies of scale in rolling out the practice for the larger firm.  
92 Willis, supra note 3, at 719-20. 
93 Id. Behavioral market failures in the mortgage industry were identified well before the 
industry’s adoption of powerful information technologies. See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 1214 
(noting that because of their own cognitive biases and reliance on intermediaries, homebuyers 
often enter into deceptive deals or take on too much risk). However, the point by Willis and 
others is that technologies greatly enhanced lenders’ ability to exploit consumer decisionmaking 
limitations. See Willis, supra note 3, at 719-20 (describing how lenders can use this technology to 
price discriminate based on risk).  
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 II. FIRMS SYSTEMATICALLY CHARGE ANTICOMPETITIVE PRICES 
This Part highlights some of the main ways sellers leverage their sophis-
tication to raise prices for boundedly rational consumers. Because companies 
continually test new pricing strategies and typically design them to go 
unnoticed, any discussion based on publicly available data cannot fully 
capture the array of practices occurring in the market.  
However, even those practices that are readily observable suggest behav-
ioral market failures are widespread in retail goods. This Part begins with a 
review of those practices. It then discusses how market constraints such as 
reputation, consumer learning, and protection by sophisticated shoppers are 
insufficient to keep these practices in check. Part III then discusses the 
aggregate harm to consumers. 
A. Evidence of Anticompetitive Practices in Retail Goods 
Anticompetitive practices in retail goods are numerous and diverse. 
Still, the driving mechanism behind each practice places it into one of two 
basic categories. The first is price misperception due to low salience. As 
Oren Bar-Gill has stated of contractual products, “[c]omplexity hides the 
true cost of the product from the imperfectly rational consumer. . . . The 
imperfectly rational consumer deals with complexity by . . . . overlooking 
non-salient price dimensions.”94  
Such price misperception in goods can occur at the store level, such as if 
consumers do not pay sufficient attention to any one of the many items in 
their shopping cart. Non-salient price dimensions can also occur on the 
individual product level, such as if consumers fail to pay adequate attention 
to the high price of the ink that they will later pay as a result of purchasing 
a printer. Consumers consequently could perfectly compare salient product 
dimensions and still overall pay higher prices because the seller has little 
incentive to price non-salient dimensions competitively.95  
The second main category includes practices that make it difficult for 
consumers who fully understand all price dimensions to make effective price 
comparisons. Sellers can make it difficult for consumers to compare prices 
by, for example, complicating product descriptions online. They also can 
cause a skewed comparison by providing the often implicit reference points 
consumers use through framing.  
 
94 BAR-GILL, supra note 5, at 18. 
95 See Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749, 
769-76 (2008) (explaining that multidimensional pricing and product dimensions enable the seller 
to drive a wedge between perceived price and actual price). 
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1. Price Misperception from Non-Salient Dimensions 
a. Misperceiving Stores’ Prices  
One of the most important choices made by consumers in mass retail is 
where to shop. Research suggests that the complexity of deciding among 
various stores hides the true total cost of stores from consumers, causing 
them to overlook the prices of non-salient items.96 Calculating the total 
price paid requires selecting a subset of products out of an average of 47,000 
unique items.97 Those prices continually fluctuate over time, often due to 
“high-low” pricing driven by discounts.98 In the thirty-one states in which 
unit pricing is not required, consumers would also need to make calculations 
for many choices to compare differently sized products.99 The complexity 
and time required to make such calculations leads consumers to use mental 
shortcuts in forming an “overall impression” of the store’s aggregate price.100 
A rational and informed consumer would calculate a store’s total cost for the 
consumer’s basket of goods and would compare that to what a similar basket 
would cost at other available stores. Instead, in comparing two stores, 
consumers consider only a small number of actual prices—as few as three to 
five out of hundreds of items purchased.101 In forming their overall price 
impression, consumers supplement these few actual prices using mental 
shortcuts, including location, décor, store size, promotional labeling, and 
price-match guarantees.102  
Just as financial institutions have responded to complexity by designing 
their pricing schemes to capitalize on consumer complexity by adding costs 
 
96 See Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 25, at 506-09 (explaining that consumer myopia causes 
consumers to overlook certain shrouded costs associated with products).  
97 See The Downside of Too Many Product Choices on Store Shelves, supra note 16.  
98 Id. (noting that there is a wide disparity between the high and low price for products within 
the same product line, in part because certain products in a line may be excluded from weekly 
discounts).  
99 Eleven states and many cities have passed mandatory unit pricing on retail shelves. See A 
Guide to Retail Pricing Laws and Regulations, NIST, http://www.nist.gov/pml/wmd/laws/pricing-
laws.cfm (last visited Mar. 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/X9T4-BFKA. 
100 Hamilton & Chernev, supra note 18, at 1 (stating that “consumers tend to rely on their 
overall impression of a store’s prices when making their purchase decisions”). In the face of 
complexity, even the decisions that are processed in a more deliberate fashion can be cognitively 
insufficient due to, for example, limited computational skills and memory. See Jolls et al., supra 
note 12, at 1477 (noting consumers’ “limited conceptual skills” and “flawed memory”).  
101 See Hamilton & Chernev, supra note 18, at 4 (discussing how consumers use a “selective 
weighting model” as a proxy). 
102 See id. at 2 (discussing price image as a marketing phenomenon). 
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through low-salient features, so have retailers.103 Retailers leverage the big 
data analytics of billions of past purchases and real-time scientific experi-
mentation across stores to model consumers’ level of price attention to 
different items.104 These analytics help them to identify the extent to which 
products are highly salient, or known value items (KVIs), and to selectively 
escalate prices to minimize the chances consumers will notice.105 Retailers 
also design the mix of other factors, such as price-match guarantees, that 
might contribute to consumers’ overall impression of the store’s prices. 
Consequently, a retailer can maintain a “low price image” even though it 
overall may have higher prices than competitors on many items, causing 
consumers to make the wrong choice about which store would actually save 
them more money.106  
Moreover, this overall sense of a store’s aggregate prices influences not 
only where consumers shop but also whether consumers believe individual 
items in that store are low-priced.107 Even individual choices of what seem 
like straightforward products can involve decisionmaking complexity due to 
the total number of choices available for that particular product and the 
total number of goods purchased in a typical shopping trip. As a result of 
consumer companies’ innovation, choice has greatly expanded in the sector 
over the past decades. For example, Tide detergent, which originally 
launched in 1949 as one product, now has forty-three distinct products 
enabling choice among dimensions such as scent, consistency (e.g., powder 
or liquid, concentrated or not), and function (e.g., stain removing or 
whitening).108 The more choices available, the more likely a consumer is to 
adopt a simplifying strategy in the purchase of that good and risk “worsening” 
 
103 See BAR-GILL, supra note 5, at 2-3 (explaining the general effect of consumer complexity 
through behavioral economics). 
104 See Duhigg, supra note 75, at 36-37 (explaining Target’s use of consumer purchasing data 
to track spending habits). One important contributor is loyalty card data, which allows retailers to 
track particular consumers’ purchases over time. 
105 KVIs are typically the big ticket or most frequently purchased items, such as milk, beef 
and Coca-Cola. See POUNDSTONE, supra note 58, at 149 (describing how supermarkets use loyalty 
card data to selectively raise prices on infrequently purchased products); Hamilton & Chernev, 
supra note 18, at 4 (“By aggressively pricing these most influential items . . . retailers have a better 
chance of influencing consumers’ impressions of the average level of prices than they would by just 
lowering prices across the board.”). Consumers often fail to notice the elevated price either 
because it is raised by too small an increment or because consumers are not paying close attention 
to the particular product’s price in the larger basket of items. 
106 Hamilton & Chernev, supra note 18, at 1-2. 
107 Id. at 1.  
108 See Guess How Many Items the Average Grocery Shopper Buys in a Year?, COUPONS IN THE 
NEWS (Jan. 23, 2014), http://couponsinthenews.com/2014/01/23/guess-how-many-items-the-
average-grocery-shopper-buys-in-a-year, archived at http://perma.cc/ENX7-WKUQ. 
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the decision outcome.109 The consumer’s overall price image of the retailer 
provides such a simplifying strategy, and it can cause consumers to view 
individual items as being relatively low-priced even when they are not.110 
Economic theory would suggest that these dynamics lead to higher prices 
on non-salient items than would be expected in markets with competitive 
pricing. The high complexity and cost of attaining information causes 
consumers to ignore a large number of items in deciding among stores. 
Instead, consumers use their overall impressions of the store, formed by 
mental shortcuts, to process low-salient items, leading them to believe they 
are getting a good deal on those items even when they are not. Retailers 
consequently have less incentive to compete on price for those non-salient 
items and thus charge supracompetitive prices.  
Consumers thus make similar mistakes in choosing a mass retailer as 
they do in choosing a credit card or mortgage contract. Consumers often 
choose the wrong financial product because they focus on a small number of 
salient contract features, such as the overall interest rate of a credit card or 
the monthly payment of a cell phone contract. As Professor Bar-Gill has 
argued, the problem extends beyond terms hidden in the fine print.111 
Consumers also irrationally underweigh contract terms about which they are 
aware.112 They incorrectly assume non-salient terms will benefit them even 
 
109 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 97 (“Social science research reveals that as 
the choices become more numerous and/or vary on more dimensions, people are more likely to 
adopt simplifying strategies.”); Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 6, at 27 (describing evidence of 
consumer confusion in choosing between complicated credit card policies). Also, recent research 
has shown that the greater the number of choices available, and the greater the number of choices 
made, the more cognitive resources are depleted. See Kathleen D. Vohs et al., Making Choices 
Impairs Subsequent Self-Control: A Limited-Resource Account of Decision Making, Self-Regulation, and 
Active Initiative, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 883, 884 (2008) (highlighting a “series of 
studies [that] has provided evidence that some self-resource is depleted by acts of self-regulation”). 
Even deciding among basic consumer goods such as scented candles and colored pens can make it 
more likely that subsequent decisions will be processed using mental shortcuts rather than in a 
systematic manner. Id. at 885-86; see also Hamilton & Chernev, supra note 18, at 9 (“[R]esearch has 
shown that many common shopping activities tend to deplete consumers’ cognitive resources, 
leaving them less able to engage in systematic information processing and decision making.” 
(citation omitted)). 
110 See Hamilton & Chernev, supra note 18, at 4 (summarizing research that showed “many 
consumers relying on as few as three to five key prices to form an overall impression of a store”). 
111 See BAR-GILL, supra note 5, at 1 (“That sellers hide one-sided terms in the fine print is 
not surprising. The goal of [this book] is to explain the design of pricing structures and other 
contract terms that are often clearly disclosed—‘dickered terms’ that consumers are aware of and 
consent to.”); Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1127 (2009) (analyzing how the presence of imperfectly rational 
borrowers increases market incentives to add complexity to contracts and hide fees). 
112 Bar-Gill, supra note 111, at 1127 (noting that some borrowers “naively assume that [terms] 
are favorable to [them]”). 
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though that is untrue.113 Similarly, shoppers irrationally assume the non-
salient items in their basket are in line with consumers’ overall impression 
of the store. Firms are able to capitalize on these errors by charging higher 
overall prices.114  
b. Misperceiving Complex Products’ Prices 
A large and increasing portion of the consumer goods market is 
comprised of individually complex products, both because traditionally 
straightforward products are becoming more complex and because new 
products are emerging. For example, in 2012, the consumer electronics 
segment surpassed $200 billion off 5.9% growth.115 Studies have concluded 
that when consumers have information about a higher number of individual 
product attributes, they make less accurate decisions in purchasing that 
product.116 Many technological consumer goods have a high number of 
product attributes that are important to consumers. For example, selecting 
the right computer requires considering attributes, such as price, size, 
memory, processing speed, sound system, operating system, and visual 
display, often based on metrics that require some technological expertise to 
understand. Thus, in some sense, many consumer goods resemble complex 
financial products in that they have a large number of features that are 
poorly understood or unknown to consumers. Even skeptics of behavioral 
law and economics-based regulations have acknowledged that greater 
consumer protection may be warranted in the face of technological products 
due to their complexity.117 
This complexity paves the way for misperception in a number of ways. 
The most prominent in the literature is the shifting of costs toward non-
salient add-on products that must be purchased to use the base item to its 
 
113 BAR-GILL, supra note 5, at 21. 
114 Some of the higher prices paid on non-salient items may be offset by lower prices on salient 
items. However, economists have concluded that such markets still end up in an anticompetitive 
equilibrium. See generally Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 25 (detailing the many mechanisms that 
shroud attempts at accurate price determinations and documenting retailers’ pervasive use of those 
mechanisms). 
115 Press Release, Consumer Elecs. Ass’n, CE Industry Yearly Revenues Expected to Surpass 
$200B for First Time ( July 24, 2012), available at https://www.ce.org/News/News-Releases/Press-
Releases/2012-Press-Releases/CE-Industry-Yearly-Revenues-Expected-to-Surpass-$2.aspx. 
116 See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 3, at 1229 (describing the results of an experiment showing 
“that subjects employed simpler decision strategies when the number of attributes became large”). 
117 See, e.g., Rosch, supra note 10, at 6 (showing a former FTC commissioner arguing for 
minimal adjustments for behavioral economics but acknowledging that consumers may be 
“prisoners of circumstances” when there is “asymmetry of information” regarding a product, as is 
often the case with complex products, like personal computers). 
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fullest extent. Examples of these base items are printers, electric toothbrushes, 
razors, and mechanized cleaning devices.118 Printers often cost about one-
tenth the cost of the lifetime cost of supplying the printer with ink.119 
Similarly, electric toothbrushes cost less than the lifetime cost of replacing 
the toothbrush heads.120 Knowing that consumers will underweight the 
follow-up costs, manufacturers offer the base product at a lower rate.121 This 
underestimation also undermines comparison shopping as consumers 
rarely compare the full lifetime price of the products and instead compare 
only the price of the base product.122 Information asymmetries factor into 
this problem, as consumers often do not know the price of the add-ons 
when they purchase nor are they guaranteed that the manufacturer or retailer 
will not modify those add-on costs after the consumer has purchased the 
original item, a move analogous to unilateral contract modification. Because 
of these bundling misperceptions, sellers do not compete on the full overall 
price, thus producing higher prices than what would be expected in markets 
absent such bundled pricing strategies.  
c. Misperceiving Deceptively Simple Products’ Prices 
Firms can also create price misperception on what otherwise seem to be 
straightforward products. Two prominent examples are packaging 
adjustments and rebates. 
Manufacturers have frequently decreased the quantity of product while 
maintaining the same packaging appearance. For example, Dial reduced 
soap size 11% while keeping the box and price the same.123 Skippy similarly 
 
118 See Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 38-39 (using the cost of printers and ink to show opportunistic 
cost shifting); Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 25, at 506-07 (same). 
119 Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 25, at 506.  
120 Our Products, PHILLIPS, http://www.sonicare.com/en_US/OurProducts/BrushHeads.aspx 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4KUQ-FK9R (recommending changing 
electric toothbrush heads four times per year); Philips Sonicare HX5610/30 Essence 5600 Rechargeable 
Electric Toothbrush, White, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/Philips-Sonicare-HX5610-01-
Rechargeable/dp/B0081MQ47C/ref=sr_1_8?s=hpc&ie=UTF8&qid=1422438455&sr=1-8 (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2SMW-JCF3 (listing the price of a Sonicare toothbrush 
as $39.95); Philips Sonicare Toothbrush E Series Generic Replacement Heads Fits: Essence, Xtreme, Elite 
and Advance (2-pack) Hx7002/62, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/Philips-Sonicare-
Toothbrush-Generic-Replacement/dp/B00NAV4IZ4/ref=pd_sim_hpc_2?ie=UTF8&refRID= 
06NM7QQAD8VNXC2B1TN4, archived at http://perma.cc/LZB4-4JS8 (last visited Mar. 21, 2015) 
(listing the cost of replacement brushes as $6.00 each). 
121 See id. (“Printer manufacturers advertise the low price of their ink-jet printers, but do not 
compete on the principal cost of ownership . . . [since] only 3 percent of printer owners claim to 
know the printing cost at the time they buy their printers.”). 
122 See id. 
123 Hirsch, supra note 14. 
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reduced its peanut butter 10% by introducing a divot in the bottom of the 
jar.124 Downsizing has occurred in a variety of products, including cereal, ice 
cream, and toilet paper.125 Such changes remain unnoticed by most 
consumers,126 amounting to an unperceived per-unit price increase resulting 
from consumer inattention. Even the presence of per-unit pricing seems not 
to clue most shoppers in to such changes.127 A rational consumer would 
decide whether to purchase based on the new, updated price because all the 
necessary information is immediately available to him.  
Such subtle packaging modifications can be compared to unilateral 
changes frequently made in existing financial contracts. Credit card companies 
often have added fees or changed interest rates by simply stating as much in 
the fine print in the monthly bill. Such unilateral modifications contributed 
to calls for regulation among legal scholars, in part because “consumers may 
pay insufficient attention to apparent ‘junk mail’ that actually changes 
substantive provisions” and harms consumers in unexpected ways.128  
Rebates also lead to price misperception when consumers decide to 
purchase an item based on the rebate price but then fail to redeem. Industry 
estimates place the percent of uncollected manufacturer rebates at about 
40%.129 This amounts to over $2 billion in unredeemed rebates each year.130 
Some non-redemption of rebates is consistent with a rational actor model.131 
A large portion, however, is due to consumer error, such as losing the rebate 
sticker or forgetting.132 In this sense, rebates capitalize on a similar consumer 
bias as behavioral law and economics scholars have identified in anticompet-
itive contractual designs: excessive consumer optimism about their future 
 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id.  
127 See POUNDSTONE, supra note 58, at 6 (noting that consumers’ “memories of prices are 
short, and memories of boxes and packages shorter”).  
128 Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. 
L. REV. 545, 588 (2014). These frequent unilateral modifications also raise the costs of being an 
informed consumer. See Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin Davis, Empty Promises, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 25 
(2010) (“[S]taying informed in the face of a stream of modifications is more costly than simply 
reading the initial contract.”). 
129 Brian Grow, The Great Rebate Runaround, BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 5, 2005, at 34.  
130 Id. 
131 See Matthew A. Edwards, The FTC and New Paternalism, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 323, 356 
(2008) (arguing that redeeming rebates “might not be wealth-maximizing, depending on the costs 
of redemption and the size of the rebate”). Rational non-redemption may occur, for example, 
when high-income consumers decide that the time spent pursuing the rebate would yield more 
money by working. Id. 
132 Grow, supra note 129, at 34; see also POUNDSTONE, supra note 58, at 177 (pointing out 
that rebate processors sometimes “mail the [rebate] check in an unmarked envelope that looks and 
feels like junk mail” to increase the chances that consumers will not cash them).  
  
1342 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 1311 
 
behavior.133 For example, consumers often overestimate the likelihood they 
will pay their monthly credit card bill on time, causing them to underestimate 
the actual costs of the credit card and thus be less effective at comparing the 
actual costs of various credit cards available.134  
Manufacturers can also increase complexity and difficulty of redemption 
so as to decrease the likelihood that consumers will redeem. Many manufac-
turers require that the consumer send in the store receipt with the price 
circled, the Universal Product Code (UPC) removed from the product 
packaging, and a long rebate form filled out.135 Any small error will trigger 
an examination from the firm, often requiring the consumer to submit more 
information and causing the consumer to give up.136 Another obstacle is 
short-term due dates as short as one week.137  
Rebates contribute to pricing misperception for those consumers who 
decide whether to purchase based on the rebate price but actually wind up 
paying the full price later. Consumers are consequently less sensitive to the 
price posted, and thus the retailer can charge a higher price to some 
consumers than otherwise possible.138 Sellers of goods can now employ 
algorithmic modeling and experimentation of various rebate structures to 
maximize surplus profits from rebates, just as financial institutions model 
likelihood of consumer behavior such as incurring late fees under different 
offers.139 Many states have responded to perceived harm from rebates by 
greatly curtailing allowable practices, with some going so far as to prohibit 
any rebate that cannot be redeemed immediately upon completion of the 
transaction. However, most states offer minimal or no restrictions on 
rebates. 
Finally, goods can have low-salient costs that consumers simply do not 
fully consider. Studies have suggested that when the tax on an item is 
posted, consumers purchase less of the item even when consumers know 
 
133 See, e.g., BAR-GILL, supra note 5, at 90-91 (listing various underestimations credit card 
consumers often make). 
134 Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 49. 
135 POUNDSTONE, supra note 58, at 177. 
136 See id. (“Minor omissions mandate ‘further research,’ requests for more paperwork, and 
transferring the case to a ‘special team.’”). 
137 Grow, supra note 129, at 36.  
138 At the same time, it is worth noting that rebates have the effect of enabling some price-
sensitive consumers to pay lower prices for the same goods, thus potentially creating a progressive 
pricing scheme. However, this requires low-income shoppers to spend time in order to pay lower 
prices, which is arguably an inefficient manner of price discrimination. 
139 See Willis, supra note 3, at 778 (noting the exploitative behavior used by financial institu-
tions that highlights “the salience of meeting immediate goals, with little or no mention of the 
price to be paid in the future”). 
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those items are taxed and the amount of the tax.140 This implies consumers 
are less price-sensitive than they would be if the full price were posted and 
that some price-sensitive consumers make purchases they otherwise would not.141  
2. Failing To Compare Effectively 
The above anticompetitive practices all involved firms charging higher 
prices because consumers did not adequately weigh some price dimension in 
a purchase. Even if consumers do adequately pay attention to all price 
dimensions, firms still have a number of methods for charging supracompetitive 
prices. 
a. Framing the Price as a Bargain 
Much attention has been paid in the behavioral law and economics 
literature to lenders’ ability to influence borrowers by leveraging cognitive 
biases such as susceptibility to framing. As Professor Patricia McCoy has 
stated, predatory lenders frame loans as large initial gains contrasted with 
small later payments.142 Retailers can also promote irrational decisions by 
designing the “frame within which information is presented.”143 Consumers 
generally assess the price of an item by comparison to reference price 
information seen in the past or immediately available.144 Because it is 
difficult to remember prices in previous trips to stores, retailers can alter 
consumers’ perception of these two reference points.145 Research suggests 
 
140 See Raj Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 
1145, 1165 (2009) (“[M]ost consumers are well informed about commodity tax rates when their 
attention is drawn to the subject. However, they do not remember to include the tax when making 
consumption decisions . . . . ”).  
141 Consumers do generally purchase fewer of many items as price increases. See MANKIW, 
supra note 47, at 11. This is especially true for discretionary items, such as soft drinks, junk food, 
and entertainment products. 
142 Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38 AKRON L. REV. 725, 731 
(2005); see also Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Social Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 24-25 
(Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. Bus., Econ. & Regulatory Policy Working Paper Series, No. 973974), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=973970 (describing the effect of 
framing on consumers’ perceptions).  
143 Hanson & Kysar, supra note 29, at 1441. 
144 See POUNDSTONE, supra note 58, at 137-39 (describing this “anchoring” effect). 
145 Past prices are difficult to remember due to cognitive limitations on remembering 
hundreds of items’ prices and also because prices change frequently in the modern retail context, 
which means that the current price must be compared to some range of prices previously seen 
rather than one price seen many times. See The Downside of Too Many Product Choices on Store 
Shelves, supra note 16 (discussing how the quantity of information that consumers must process in 
supermarkets is overwhelming); see also Jolls et al., supra note 12, at 1477 (discussing cognitive 
limitations such as memory).  
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retailers can leverage this control to cause consumers to pay significantly 
higher prices for goods.146  
Perhaps the most straightforward application of framing is retailers’ 
frequent implication that their current prices are some kind of a discount 
compared to their previous prices or to other retailers’ prices, even when 
that is not true. Though there are laws restricting such practices, they are 
almost never enforced.147 Also, retailers list an item at a higher price for a 
short time to comply with the law, even if the sole purpose is to later make 
the discount price more attractive. A recent examination of 54,000 adver-
tised holiday deals found that less than 1% in fact offered lower-than-normal 
prices.148 Instead, companies will use an inflated manufacturer’s suggested 
retail price or a pre-holiday, artificially increased price as the reference 
point for claiming huge discounts, even when the discounted price is 
actually the more standard price.149 Experiments found clothing retailers 
sell significantly more when they mention a $40 clothing product was 
previously sold at $48 than if the item were simply listed at $39.150 Research 
also suggests that if a good is labeled in a way that suggests it is on sale, it 
will similarly be seen as cheaper solely due to that labeling.151 Thus, retailers 
have substantial power to frame a price as a gain, rather than a loss and thus 
to promote price misperception.  
Retailers also control the framing by deciding which nearby prices are 
used as references. For example, in one experiment, participants were 
offered the choice between a “premium” beer at $2.60, which had a rating of 
70 out of 100 in quality, or a cheaper beer at $1.80, which had a lower quality 
rating of 50.152 About 33% of participants chose the $1.80 beer.153 However, 
when an additional “extra” premium beer was offered alongside the first two 
beers, 90% chose the original premium beer, instead of the original 66%.154 
 
146 See BARDEN, supra note 57, at 50 (explaining that customers are willing to pay more for 
goods when first exposed to a high anchor price); POUNDSTONE, supra note 58, at 151-52 
(describing a study of beer consumers who consistently chose higher priced beer on the assump-
tion that it was higher quality).  
147 See Robert Pitofsky et al., Pricing Laws Are No Bargain for Consumers, ANTITRUST, Sum-
mer 2004, at 62 (noting that the FTC has not brought a single case against fictitious discounting 
practices since 1979). 
148 Farhad Manjoo, Online Deals for Holiday Shopping: Buyer Beware, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/11/technology/personaltech/online-deals-for-holiday-shopping-
buyer-beware.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/8QZE-8TQZ. 
149 Id. 
150 BARDEN, supra note 57, at 51.  
151 Id. 
152 POUNDSTONE, supra note 58, at 151-52.  
153 Id. 
154 Id.  
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In other words, simply adding a premium item that nobody purchased 
caused a substantial portion of the market to pay 45% more than they 
otherwise would have paid. Similar results have been found in actual stores. 
Williams-Sonoma, for example, saw sales of its $279 breadmaker nearly 
double after it introduced an adjacent higher-priced, $429 larger breadmaker 
that hardly anyone purchased.155  
Retailers can leverage this framing to design pricing architecture. Using 
technology that shows where the eye is looking, retailers have determined 
where most consumers naturally look when they walk down an aisle. 
Because the first price the consumer sees creates an anchoring effect 
influencing the consumer’s processing of subsequent items, retailers can 
anchor the consumer at a higher price so that subsequent items appear 
cheaper by comparison.156 By testing various shelf layouts, retailers can thus 
empirically identify choice architecture that is most likely to yield 
supracompetitive prices. Similarly, Amazon can strategically determine the 
mix and order of search results for similar anchoring. 
b. Obfuscating Product Information  
Like sellers of financial products, sellers of goods can leverage infor-
mation asymmetries to undermine comparison shopping. Perhaps the most 
straightforward approach is to label essentially identical products differently 
across retailers. Mattress manufacturers, for example, make it impractical to 
compare across stores by giving different model names and even manipulating 
the technical specifications for identical products.157 Retailers have also 
“swapped out” bar codes to undermine consumers’ ability to compare 
prices.158  
A more behaviorally-focused means of undermining comparison shopping 
is to make descriptions of products or prices needlessly complicated. 
Economists have found that even sellers in essentially a commodity-
consumer market can raise their margins six to nine percentage points above 
what would be expected in fully competitive markets by such “obfuscation.”159  
By way of illustration, a typical product search at Amazon, the leading 
U.S. online retailer, returns thousands of results. Consumers can no longer 
 
155 Id. at 156. 
156 On the anchoring effect in general, see THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 23-24, 
and, on the importance of reference prices, see Tridib Mazumdar et al., Reference Price Research: 
Review and Propositions, J. MARKETING, Oct. 2005, at 84, 99, available at http:// 
bear.warrington.ufl.edu/weitz/mar7786/articles/reference%20price%20review.pdf. 
157 Ellison, supra note 43, at 157. 
158 Harris, supra note 65. 
159 Ellison & Ellison, supra note 15, at 428-29. 
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sort those results by unit pricing, as was previously the case. Moreover, 
when results are sorted by total product price, the results require considerable 
time to figure out which items are truly lowest price. Obfuscation tech-
niques include listing prices as a range rather than a single price. For 
example, searching for “canteen” returns 15,344 results. If this is simplified 
to a 40-ounce Klean Kanteen, 64 results are returned. Sorting these results 
by price returns a “lowest price” item listed as “$12.75 to $67.00.” Clicking 
on this result yields a product page with twenty-three different product 
permutations, each with a different color, product bundle, size, and price. 
The cheapest 40-ounce canteen in this page was orange and cost $20.34. To 
get a more mainstream color such as black in 40 ounces, it would cost more. 
After clicking on over twenty permutations in this listing, I was unable to 
locate any canteen for $12.75, yet that is the price Amazon presumably used 
to list this particular product first. Moving through many other listings in 
the same search, each requiring specifying size and then looking at different 
prices by color, at the 17th listing (“$18.20–$32.85”) I located a lower-priced 
blue Klean Kanteen for $20.13.  
This time-consuming process would need to be undergone for many 
different results to locate the cheapest Klean Kanteen. If the specific size 
and brand were not determined, finding the best deal out of thousands of 
results would be even more time-consuming and presumably few consumers 
would actually go through hundreds of individual product pages to find 
what the Amazon algorithm could do in a microsecond if the company 
wished: locate the cheapest item.160 Once Amazon’s best deal is found, 
comparing it to other websites’ best deals would be even more difficult and 
time consuming.  
Difficulty in comparison shopping due to excessively long contracts has 
similarly contributed to market failures in consumer financial products, 
leading to a scholarly and regulatory push for greater standardization of 
products.161 Indeed, consumer protection law has long sought to address 
 
160 AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2015) (search for “Klean Kanteen”; 
then click on “40 Ounces & Above” in the left-hand column; then select “Price: Low to High” 
from the “Sort by” drop-down menu). 
161 See Willis, supra note 3, at 727 (criticizing the lack of transparency and absence of suffi-
cient information for consumers in the prime and subprime loan markets). Professors Ayres and 
Schwartz attempt to solve a related problem, the fact that people do not read long and complex 
contracts, by recommending firms be required to know their customers’ expectations and to 
prioritize clearly and prominently communicating disclosures that would be harmful but 
unexpected. Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 128, at 551-55. 
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information asymmetries that enable sellers to charge anticompetitive 
prices.162 
B. Potential Market Constraints on Supracompetitive Pricing 
Although the previous Section provides evidence of firm behavior that 
has the potential to systemically undermine consumer decisionmaking and 
thus create consumer goods market failures, markets have several potentially 
powerful self-regulating mechanisms that could theoretically mitigate the 
harm from such behavior. This Section discusses three: reputational 
constraints, consumer learning, and protection by a subset of sophisticated 
consumers.  
A close consideration of each suggests that they are currently insufficient 
to protect today’s markets from the harm created by the sophistication gap 
between consumers and firms. They likely were more effective checks on 
anticompetitive practices in the markets that existed in the early 1980s, 
when the Reagan administration ushered in a decades-long deregulatory 
era. However, firms’ incredible growth in size, technology, and scientific 
pricing has diminished the potentially market-correcting effects of these 
mechanisms.  
1. Reputational Constraints 
One common argument in consumer protection is that reputational 
concerns will stamp out many bad practices, thus making some regulations 
unnecessary.163 The argument is that consumers will be less likely to patronize 
businesses that engage in questionable practices.164 Because those businesses 
will thus lose sales, they will have an incentive to refrain from such practices.165 
Economists have provided support for this view through survey evidence 
suggesting that consumers do view pricing practices that exploit market 
power, such as that gained by sellers of snow shovels after a snow storm, as 
 
162 See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Infor-
mation: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 631 (1979) (asserting that the 
normative question of whether consumer protection regulation is justified in the face of imperfectly 
informed consumers “should be whether the existence of imperfect information has produced 
noncompetitive prices and terms”). 
163 See Eitan Gerstner & James D. Hess, Can Bait and Switch Benefit Consumers?, 9 MARKETING 
SCI. 114, 115 (1990) (“Consumers will eventually anticipate retailers’ behavior, so stores that 
overuse these practices will eventually develop bad reputations and lose.”).  
164 Id.  
165 See id. at 117 (studying how a company’s “reputation for bait and switch” practices affects a 
consumer’s decision to purchase).  
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unfair.166 Observable firm behavior lends further support to this theory. For 
example, Home Depot does not raise prices following a devastating hurri-
cane although it could make higher profits due to the increased demand. 
Presumably the retailer, like others who have behaved similarly during 
demand spikes, fears harm to its reputation.167  
Two responses mitigate this potential check on anticompetitive pricing 
practices in consumer goods. First, firms leverage their sophistication to 
ensure their practices go unnoticed.168 Indeed, behavioral pricing practices 
are more successful when consumers are unaware. Retailers can scientifically 
test and hone practices that capitalize on irrationality just below the awareness 
threshold, or as industry executives sometimes describe it, within consumers’ 
“autopilot” decisionmaking.169 They then adjust at the first sign consumers 
have become aware. For example, a backlash resulted when Target’s algo-
rithms successfully identified early-stage pregnant shoppers and advertised 
directly to them. The company responded not by refraining from using such 
insights but by making its advertising seem random, such as by placing ads 
for lawn mowers alongside those for diapers.170 Thus, reputational 
constraints surely do curtail some practices, but firms carefully adjust and 
scientifically test their practices to remain under the threshold of awareness 
that would trigger reputational costs.  
Second, even when consumers become aware of supracompetitive pricing, 
such as through media coverage, most people suffer from an overconfidence 
bias: they think they are not susceptible to cognitive biases. Thus, even if 
they understood that discounted prices influence people and knew a retailer 
was questionably creating original prices for the purpose of influencing 
their decisions, many consumers would incorrectly think they were 
 
166 See Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the 
Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 734 (1986) (arguing that consumers feel entitled to a particular 
reference price, an expectation which is violated when a company attempts to exploit a sudden 
shift in demand). 
167 See Jolls et al., supra note 12, at 1514-15 (describing how Home Depot did not raise prices 
on building supplies after Hurricane Andrew hit Florida “despite the fact that the stock could have 
been sold at an enormous (short-term) profit, and despite the fact that no law banned price 
increases”). 
168 See, e.g., Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Three Paradoxes of Big Data, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 41, 42-43 (2013), available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/ 
files/online/topics/66_StanLRevOnline_41_RichardsKing.pdf (noting that collection of data about 
consumers is, by design, invisible).  
169 See BARDEN, supra note 57, at 14-15 (stating that a person’s “autopilot” system receives 
millions of bits of information each second). 
170 See Duhigg, supra note 75, at 36-37 (discussing how Target goes to great lengths to hide its 
use of advanced behavioral modeling from customers, thus avoiding negatively impacting its 
reputation). 
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unaffected by such practices.171 Consequently, a retailer’s reputation for 
using practices capitalizing on psychological biases is unlikely to hurt it 
since most consumers would mistakenly assume they are unaffected by such 
practices and would consequently continue shopping at the retailer.  
Indeed, reputational concerns may, if anything, hurt companies that do 
not engage in supracompetitive pricing. Much of supracompetitive pricing 
causes consumers to think they are getting better deals than they are.172 
Retailers that refrain from supracompetitive pricing practices risk being 
perceived as offering lower value for their prices. J.C. Penney learned this in 
2011 when a new CEO decided to get rid of rampant discount pricing and 
instead offer everyday low prices.173 Even though the prices offered were 
ultimately about the same as they had been before, consumers believed they 
were higher.174 Sales consequently plummeted 25%, causing the chain to 
return to discount pricing.175  
2. Learning 
Consumers’ ability to learn about prices provides, at least in theory, a 
particularly promising market constraint on anticompetitive practices in 
consumer goods. Unlike with products such as credit cards and mortgages, 
which consumers typically purchase once every few years or once in a 
lifetime, consumers purchase some individual goods, such as cereal and 
soap, several times each year. This repetition theoretically makes it possible 
for consumers to become more sophisticated shoppers over time as they 
learn from their mistakes. They may, for example, make a poor decision on 
one product and thereafter become more careful in purchasing the same or 
even unrelated products.176 Consumers may also learn from others’ purchasing 
mistakes. Thus, consumer learning can provide a check against anticompeti-
tive practices in retail goods.  
 
171 See Bubb & Pildes, supra note 35, at 1649-50 (raising concerns about the “sophistication by 
disclosure” approach due to consumer overconfidence and ability of businesses to exploit even a 
smaller remaining bias). 
172 See supra subsection II.A.2.  
173 Jim Aisner, What Went Wrong at J.C. Penney?, FORBES (Aug. 21, 2013, 11:23 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2013/08/21/what-went-wrong-at-j-c-penney/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/AXC2-JA5Q. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 See JOSEPH P. MULHOLLAND, SUMMARY REPORT ON THE FTC BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS CONFERENCE 9-10 (2007), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/reports/summary-report-ftc-behavioral-economics-conference/070914mulhollandrpt. 
pdf (summarizing conference comments by Alan Schwartz on the possibility of consumers 
learning from past mistakes). 
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Learning is, however, insufficient to prevent a range of consumer goods 
behavioral market failures. Because much of shopping happens in “autopilot 
mode,” consumers’ focus is diverted, which hinders detection of errors and 
ultimately prevents the aforementioned consumer learning process. For 
example, once consumers form their overall impression of a store’s prices as 
low or high, they do not rationally adjust that impression even when a 
store’s actual prices have changed.177 They instead continue to rely on non-
price cues and their historical image of the retailer’s prices, even though 
that image was originally formed by heavily relying on heuristics.178 One 
likely explanation for this is confirmation bias: consumers tend to block out 
new information that is inconsistent with their existing beliefs, such as 
higher prices at stores for which they have a low price image.179 
The high volume of available products and rapid changes in the market 
are also large obstacles to learning. In previous generations of retail with far 
fewer products and a far slower pace of innovation, it would be more 
feasible to remember how prices change over time. Given that consumers 
now purchase hundreds of different items multiple times annually, this 
memory task becomes more challenging. Also, sellers now frequently change 
product prices, names, sizes, labels, and even product locations within the 
store, despite minimal changes to the core product itself. While rapid 
product innovation benefits consumers in many ways, it also means that 
what is learned in one purchase is not necessarily applicable in a subsequent 
purchase. 
Finally, the small value at stake for many products makes peer learning 
unlikely. While consumers may consult experts or peers for larger purchases, 
such as televisions or computers, they are unlikely to spend the time to do 
so for clothing or food purchases.180 And even for larger purchases, it is 
difficult to find advice that can be trusted, that incorporates knowledge of 
the latest products in a fast-moving market, and that is tailored to the 
consumer’s particular interests (rather than the usage preferences of a 
friend).  
 
177 See Hamilton & Chernev, supra note 18, at 13 (“Specifically, consumers who have well-
established opinions about the overall price level of a retailer will be less likely to change their 
price image on the basis of new information than those who hold weaker price image beliefs.”).  
178 See id. at 12 (outlining factors that affect the accuracy of price images formed by consumers). 
179 See id. at 13 (explaining that “the degree to which consumers adjust their price image of a 
given retailer in the presence of discrepant information is a function of the strength of their 
current beliefs about a retailer’s price image”). 
180 See Bar-Gill, supra note 95, at 757-58 (finding that consumers are likely to seek advice 
when faced with big purchase decisions). 
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3. Protection by Sophisticated Shoppers 
Another possibility, articulated by Alan Schwartz and Louis Wilde in 
the legal literature, is that a critical mass of sophisticated consumers could 
shield unsophisticated consumers from harmful decisions.181 For example, if 
enough sophisticated shoppers switched stores when prices on low-salient 
items were raised, the gains from higher prices paid by unsophisticated 
customers might not justify the losses from sophisticated customers switching 
stores.182 This would keep stores from raising prices on low-salient items, 
thus benefitting even unsophisticated consumers. Meanwhile, if stores offer 
products for both kinds of consumers, unsophisticated shoppers might 
accidentally choose the sophisticated product simply because it is on the 
shelf, limiting the number of potential sales to the sophisticated shoppers 
who will not purchase unsophisticated goods.183 
While historically these dynamics may have protected consumers, they 
are likely becoming less important for three reasons. First, sophistication is 
relative, and as discussed above, seller sophistication and market complexity 
have grown so much over the past several decades that the bar for being a 
sophisticated shopper is quite high and growing.184 Many individual products 
have become more complex. At the same time, sophisticated shopping for 
more straightforward items would require digital access to price and 
product information in a variety of stores or consumers would need to 
spend large amounts of time putting that information together. Once the 
information is acquired, it would be no simple task, even with a spreadsheet, 
to calculate the total costs of different configurations of store visits—how 
many stores to visit and which items to buy at which stores. Transportation 
costs and time estimates would also need to be considered. As such, the bar 
for sophistication is high, and there is no evidence that such sophistication 
has materialized within consumer goods markets in a sufficiently substantial 
mass. 
Second, refined segmentation of product categories makes it less likely 
that consumers will accidentally make the best choice. Markets of only a few 
segments in the early 1980s, each with many consumers, have given way to 
highly segmented modern markets—in some instances moving toward 
 
181 See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 162, at 663-65 (outlining the difficulty that firms face in 
determining which consumers are sophisticated, leading to a fair price for all). 
182 Id. 
183 Id.  
184 See supra Section I.B (discussing factors that, combined, have led to a less sophisticated 
consumer, particularly when shopping for nondurable goods). 
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segments of a single consumer.185 In a market with ten product segments, 
the likelihood of an unsophisticated consumer stumbling on the sophisticated 
choice is innately less than in a market with three segments.186 
Finally, even if markets had fewer segments, the nature of behavioral 
pricing practices prevents unsophisticated shoppers from serendipitously 
selecting the best deals. Unsophisticated shoppers will not accidentally 
purchase the higher-priced printer that corresponds to the lower costs of 
ink. They will instead choose the cheap printer with (low-salient) expensive 
ink and pay more overall. Also, retailers leverage their scientific studies of 
consumers’ eye movement sequences to place the sophisticated choices 
where consumers would be least likely to look—whether on a computer 
screen or on a store shelf. They can further direct shoppers toward anticom-
petitively priced items through in-store advertising. 
It is important to note, however, that a critical mass of sophisticated 
shoppers providing protection for less sophisticated shoppers has the 
potential to play a more meaningful role than it currently does in moving 
goods markets toward competitive pricing. This could occur if retailers were 
required to provide information intermediaries with digital price and 
product information, thus arming a critical mass of shoppers. This policy 
recommendation is discussed further in Part V. 
Ultimately, the question of whether market forces such as reputational 
constraints, consumer learning, and sophisticated shoppers correct anticom-
petitive practices is an empirical one. The persistence of “lemon” used car 
markets and the widespread predatory lending practices prior to the 2008 
financial crisis support the notion that markets are often unable to self-
correct for even highly visible, questionable practices.187 The most convincing 
evidence that these market mechanisms do not keep anticompetitive 
practices in check within consumer goods markets is the systemic presence 
of those anticompetitive practices and the empirical evidence that they 
cause consumers to misperceive prices. It is difficult to reconcile such 
 
185 See DOUG STEPHENS, THE RETAIL REVIVAL: REIMAGINING BUSINESS IN THE 
NEW AGE OF CONSUMERISM 91-95 (2013) (noting that modern consumers are less likely to 
purchase “average,” general-purpose goods and instead demand more niche items tailored to their 
specific needs). 
186 Moreover, thanks to rapid replacement inventory systems, retailers can also devote less 
shelf space to the smart choices than the percentage of sophisticated shoppers in the market would 
suggest. So, if 30% of consumers would make the sophisticated choice, retailers could devote 10% 
of shelf space to that product and replenish the inventory rapidly, rather than devoting 30% of 
shelf space to the sophisticated choice permanently. 
187 For a discussion of pricing within used car markets, see generally George A. Akerlof, The 
Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
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empirics with a rationality-based theory of consumer behavior in the retail 
goods sector.  
 III. AGGREGATE HARMS ARE POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT 
Sellers’ anticompetitive practices have the potential to cost households 
hundreds of dollars or more annually. The alternative choice—spending 
additional time shopping to outsmart pricing practices—is impractical and 
itself harmful. The additional costs likely reach all consumers but are 
particularly troubling for low-income families, for whom even a few 
hundred dollars can have meaningful health and educational implications.188 
A. The Costs of Market Failure May Be Significant 
Though more comprehensive studies are needed, a number of empirical 
studies indicate how much extra consumers may pay in specific contexts due 
to anticompetitive pricing. From these figures, it is possible to gain a sense 
of the total monetary cost to households annually. Related costs, such as any 
resulting overconsumption, are not readily quantifiable. 
In the most empirically robust study available—the only one to have 
access to a firm’s internal cost information—economists Glenn Ellison and 
Sara Fisher Ellison found that firms selling computer accessories to 
consumers online earned margins six to nine percentage points higher due 
to pricing obfuscation.189 These findings were all the more striking because 
the markets otherwise demonstrated conditions that would be associated 
with fully competitive markets—ease of entry, minimal product differentia-
tion, and low search costs.190  
Other field studies are less comprehensive because they measure only 
one anticompetitive practice rather than the total amount possible from an 
array of such practices. For example, purchasers of clothing items in a mail-
order catalog paid 23% more when the price ended in “9” compared to 
prices ending in other numbers.191 Of course, retailers should be able to end 
their prices with whatever numbers they choose. And clothing may be 
 
188 Many of the working poor live on the verge of financial collapse. See generally Sara Stern-
berg Greene, The Broken Safety Net: A Study of Earned Income Tax Credit Recipients and a Proposal for 
Repair, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 515 (2013) (discussing the many challenges, including financial 
instability, faced by the 26.8 million families receiving the Earned Income Tax Credit). 
189 See Ellison & Ellison, supra note 15, at 428-29 (examining the computer modules market 
and comparing the existing 12% markup to the expected 3% to 6% markup at marginal cost 
pricing). 
190 See id. at 432 (describing the landscape of firms selling computer parts online). 
191 BARDEN, supra note 57, at 50-51. 
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unrepresentative of many goods that consumers purchase more regularly. 
But this study provides another data point on the potential magnitude of 
behavioral pricing, especially given that it measured only the effect of the 
last number in the price. And it does so in a context in which consumers 
were typically purchasing a very small number of items; thus, presumably 
the prices of those few items were salient. 
Indeed, given the underlying psychology, low-price items may be just as 
anticompetitively priced as more substantial purchases such as clothing. 
Low-priced items may be purchased more frequently, but they also have 
lower salience. An anticompetitive 15% price increase on a $2 item would 
amounts to $0.30 extra, which provides less incentive to spend extra time or 
pay extra attention than the $39 item of clothing.192 In the case of the 
imperceptible downsizing of packaging by Skippy, Dial, and others, 
although the equilibrium anticompetitive price increase is unknown, the 
changes typically amounted to a 10% price increase for an array of products.193 
Laboratory studies have also estimated consumer willingness to pay 
higher prices. Framing effects were found to make consumers pay on 
average 11% more for beer,194 over 100% more for electronics items such as 
cameras and DVDs,195 and 20% more for clothing.196 Field studies typically 
find a smaller magnitude than laboratory studies. However, by focusing on 
one behavioral lever for increasing prices, many studies likely underestimate 
the magnitude of possible higher prices in their respective settings.  
Reaching an aggregate annual figure for expenditures requires extrapo-
lating from these existing studies to markets that exhibit anticompetitive 
practices but have not been directly studied. Assuming a 5% price increase—
one percentage point below the low end of Ellison and Ellison’s estimates 
and one-half to one-third of the magnitude found in other studies—would 
provide a conservative perspective based on the empirical data. A 10% figure 
is a reasonable high end of the range, as it is closer to the other studies 
 
192 See Wagner A. Kamakura et al., Measuring Market Efficiency and Welfare Loss, 15 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 289, 289 (1988) (“Overall, since the benefits of searching to find the most 
efficient brand may fail to exceed the costs of doing so, the optimal decision may be to purchase an 
inefficient brand—one whose price is above the minimum for its characteristics.”). 
193 See Hirsch, supra note 14 (explaining that the addition of a dimple to the bottom of some 
jars effectively reduced the volume without the public perceiving a change). 
194 See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text. The figure was calculated by applying the 
45% increase in price paid by 24% of consumers, or 0.24 * 0.45 = 0.108. 
195 Rashmi Adaval & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Conscious and Nonconscious Comparisons with Price 
Anchors: Effects on Willingness to Pay for Related and Unrelated Products, 48 J. MARKETING RES. 355, 
358, 360 (2011) (reporting results of experiment in which subjects were exposed to low and high 
anchor prices and then asked the price they would be willing to pay for the item). 
196 Id. 
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finding double-digit price increases and is only one percentage point above 
the high end of Ellison and Ellison, which studied a setting favorable to 
comparison shopping.197 
Assuming expenditures on anticompetitively priced goods are made in 
proportion to general household expenditures,198 a family earning between 
$20,000 and $29,999—which covers the poverty line for a family of four—
would pay an extra $370 annually at the 5% rate due to market failures.199 At 
the 10% rate, families in this range would spend an additional $740 as a 
result of anticompetitive practices. For a family earning $50,000 per year— 
about the median U.S. salary—this overcharge would amount to $600 to 
$1200 annually.200 
In different families, these several hundred dollars annually would be 
spent differently. However, economic development research suggests that 
many low-income families would spend additional income on health, better 
food, and education.201 Studies also suggest that additional money available 
to low-income families can increase the quality of parenting, which has 
lifelong implications, especially for children’s psychological health.202 
Because health and education are two important predictors of upward 
mobility and contribute to well-being, especially among low-income families, 
lowering the impact of supracompetitive pricing could contribute to a 
reduction of poverty and an improvement in upward mobility.  
B. Alternative Cost: Paying with Time 
 [T]here may be some circumstances when consumers simply do not take the time or 
make the effort needed to act rationally. Think, for example, of instances in which 
an asymmetry of information (or understanding) between sellers and buyers exists 
only because consumers are slothful or are otherwise willfully “ignorant, unthinking, 
 
197 See Ellison & Ellison, supra note 15, at 448-50 (listing the price-cost margin markups from 
a study of price elasticities on the internet). 
198 See infra Section III.C (discussing the differential impact of market failures by income). 
199 A family at this income range spends an average of about $7417 annually on consumer 
goods. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 9. Figures exclude expenditures 
on vehicles, cell phones, and gasoline. 
200 See id. 
201 See JOSEPH HANLON ET AL., JUST GIVE MONEY TO THE POOR: THE DEVELOPMENT 
REVOLUTION FROM THE GLOBAL SOUTH 6 (2010) (reviewing literature on developing country 
aid and concluding that children are the largest beneficiaries of all forms of cash transfers by 
decreasing malnutrition and school truancy).  
202 Moises Velasquez-Manoff, When the Poor Get Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2014, at 12 
(summarizing a study concluding that an additional $9000 provided to poor families improved 
behavior and psychological health in large part due to “improve[d] parenting quality”).  
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or credulous.” In those circumstances, I am not at all sure that consumers are 
deserving of protection by the government (or anyone else). 
— Former FTC Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch203 
 
It is often assumed that shopping for consumer goods is so straightforward 
that consumers should be expected either to spend the time necessary to 
fully research prices or to be considered to be paying the price they deserve. 
However, many supracompetitive pricing practices increase the time needed 
to shop effectively. Lost time can have real opportunity costs. It is thus a 
harm worth considering in regulatory analyses of consumer goods.  
Most behavioral economics–related practices create temporal costs for 
consumers. Significant time would be lost by repeatedly analyzing every 
price dimension of smaller items looking for the behavioral element, such as 
a subtly downsized product or framing effect. As one former senior marketing 
executive puts it: “If we were to reflectively think about every purchase 
decision in the supermarket, it would take so long to do our shopping that 
we would starve to death.”204 
As another example, manufacturers add shopping time to cross-store 
comparisons by using separate names and UPCs in separate stores. To 
locate the same mattress in competing stores, a consumer must align 
numerous features, such as the height, coil count, quilt top, comfort 
padding, and edge support. If the same name or UPC were used for the 
mattress, comparison would require knowing just that one piece of information.  
The average consumer spends about 130 hours per year shopping for 
consumer goods, excluding travel.205 It is unclear how much more time is 
required due to obfuscation practices that make it more difficult to 
understand product attributes or prices or how much additional time 
consumers would need to spend to correct market failures. But maximizing 
savings could require considerable amounts of time. For example, one 
dedicated couponer calculated that she was spending eight to twelve hours 
per week hunting down coupons for a savings of $50 to $70 per week—an 
hourly savings of only $8.75, far less than she made at her full-time job.206 
 
203 See Rosch, supra note 10, at 7. 
204 See BARDEN, supra note 57, at 15. 
205 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, AMERICAN TIME USE SURVEY—2012 RESULTS 
tbl.1 (2013). This number was calculated by averaging the time men and women spent per day on 
“consumer goods purchases” and multiplying by 365 days.  
206 Lyz Lenz, Does Cutting Coupons Really Save You? One Mom Does the Math, LEARNVEST 
(June 21, 2012), http://www.learnvest.com/2012/06/does-cutting-coupons-really-save-you-one-
mom-does-the-math, archived at http://perma.cc/DF8Y-Q5CJ; see also Naomi Mannino, 7 Smart 
Strategies of Extreme Couponers, BANKRATE, http://www.bankrate.com/finance/frugal/smart-
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Time can have important implications for consumers’ health and 
well-being. For example, parents’ ability to spend time with their children 
is a major predictor of future academic success, psychological well-being, 
and even physical health.207 Being able to relax during non-work hours—
which for most presumably does not include spending additional time 
shopping—has been linked to job performance.208  
It follows that taking the time to shop “rationally” in a highly complex 
sector in which sophisticated firms engage in widespread obfuscation would 
require time investments that may be societally and individually harmful. 
Thus, the fact that consumers could spend considerable time researching 
options to lessen the effect of practices that make it more difficult to 
comparison shop should not be grounds for failing to examine whether 
regulation of such practices is appropriate.  
C. Inequality Implications 
The question of how behavioral market failures in the consumer sector 
translate into inequality has largely escaped direct study. Indirect studies 
that are available provide reason to believe that behavioral market failures in 
the consumer sector hit low- and middle-income consumers hardest.  
Low- and middle-income consumers account for the bulk of annual 
consumer goods spending.209 However, the top 10% of income earners own 
80% of stocks, including those held in retirement accounts.210 Thus, any 
portion of supracompetitive pricing that becomes profit for businesses 
 
strategies-extreme-couponers.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/GYU7-
SC5H (“Extreme couponers average more than 20 hours per week couponing, buy many multiples 
of products, [and] spend many hours each shopping trip . . . .”).  
207 See Sabrina Tavernise, Poor Dropping Further Behind Rich in School, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 
2012, at A1 (“One reason for the growing gap in achievement, researchers say, could be that 
wealthy parents invest more time and money than ever before in their children (in weekend sports, 
ballet, music lessons, math tutors, and in overall involvement in their children’s schools), while 
lower-income families, which are now more likely than ever to be headed by a single parent, are 
increasingly stretched for time and resources.”). 
208 See generally Charlotte Fritz & Sabine Sonnentag, Recovery, Health, and Job Performance: 
Effects of Weekend Experiences, 10 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 187 (2005) (summarizing 
the literature suggesting that the amount and quality of leisure time influences job performance 
and extending this finding to weekend time in particular). Consumer protection scholars focusing 
on the financial sector have also considered non-monetary harms. See, e.g., Angela Littwin, Coerced 
Debt: The Role of Consumer Credit in Domestic Violence, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 951, 955 (2012) (arguing 
that debt “becomes a major obstacle to escaping abusive relationships”).  
209 See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 1 (listing consumer units earning 
$150,000 and above as accounting for 14% of total spending on goods categories).  
210 LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 387 tbl.6.6 (12th 
ed. 2012). 
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transfers wealth from low- and middle-income households to the top 10% of 
earners.211 Although the question of how much becomes profit has not been 
studied, industry indications suggest that behaviorally based pricing practices 
significantly increase margins.212 
This inequality mechanism is different from that typically discussed in 
the law and economics literature on consumer markets: inequality resulting 
from regressive prices.213 For example, scholars have considered whether 
low-income consumers may pay more to use credit cards and mortgages if 
they are more likely to choose the wrong product.214  
Scholars have intensely studied the question of whether low-income 
consumers overall pay more for goods, but the literature is inconclusive.215 
Scholars have paid far less attention to the question of the distributional 
implications of anticompetitive practices in goods.  
Even if low-income consumers currently pay about the same as high-
income consumers for goods, anticompetitive practices could still have 
distributional implications. It is likely, for example, that some anticompetitive 
pricing practices are progressive because they enable price discrimination in 
accordance with ability to pay. For example, because low-income families 
are more price sensitive, they have greater motivation to spend time collecting 
and analyzing product information.216 Spending time shopping pays off, by 
one estimate yielding 7-10% savings.217 Low-income consumers may be more 
willing to spend this extra time shopping or sending in rebates.218 These 
 
211 Due to industry consolidation, the vast majority of consumer goods sales go to large 
companies. For example, the top 10 retailers alone control 68% of the supermarket industry.  THE 
REINVESTMENT FUND, UNDERSTANDING THE GROCERY INDUSTRY 5 chart 2 (2011).  
212 See MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 73, at 6 (claiming margins can increase 60% by using big 
data analytics); POUNDSTONE, supra note 58, at 148 (concluding that “optimizing a company’s 
prices typically increases profit margins by about 2 percentage points”). Some of the surplus prices 
paid are eaten up by the inefficiencies of supracompetitive pricing practices. See infra Section III.D 
(discussing market inefficiencies).  
213 BAR-GILL, supra note 5, at 97-101, 172-73.  
214 Id. 
215 See Christian Broda et al., The Role of Prices in Measuring the Poor’s Living Standards, J. 
ECON. PERSP., Spring 2009, at 77, 82-86 (arguing that the poor pay less for the same goods, 
based on store scanner data); Gregory Kurtzon & Robert McClelland, Do the Poor Pay More Store-
By-Store? 4 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Working Paper No. 437, 2010), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/ore/pdf/ec100050.pdf (asserting that the poor pay about the same overall, based 
on telephone survey data).  
216 See Hamilton & Chernev, supra note 18, at 8 (“As consumers become more price sensitive, 
they tend to pay greater attention to prices when shopping.”) 
217 See Mark Aguiar & Erik Hurst, Life-Cycle Prices and Production, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1533, 
1534 (2007). 
218 See Grow, supra note 129, at 34-36 (explaining that 40% of all rebates never get redeemed, in 
part because some “think the 50¢, $50—or even $200—is just not worth the hassle of collecting”). 
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consumers also may be more willing to look through hundreds of Amazon 
search results to find the lowest per-unit price. 
On the other hand, economists and psychologists have found that low-
income families suffer from reduced cognition overall—especially on 
money-related topics—due to the many general stresses of poverty and the 
extra stress that monetary decisionmaking entails when money is tight.219 
This implies that low-income working consumers, compared to high-income 
consumers, may disproportionately succumb to anticompetitive practices 
that increase the cognitive burden of making informed choices. This would 
be expected if low-income consumers are unable to make up for any reduced 
cognition by spending additional time.  
Also, anticompetitive practices would hit low- and middle-income 
consumers hardest for the simple fact that spending on goods is a greater 
percentage of their budgets. Households earning over $150,000 annually 
spend about 19% of their expenditures on mass retail goods, while households 
earning between $55,000 and $25,000 spend about 24% on those goods.220  
Ultimately, the literature does not enable strong conclusions to be made 
about how anticompetitive pricing affects the prices paid by different 
income groups. But there is a stronger foundation for concluding that 
pricing practices increase income inequality by transferring wealth from 
mostly low- and middle-income consumers to large businesses that are 
disproportionately owned by high-income groups. It is also likely that low-
income consumers disproportionately pay with their time and pay higher 
overcharge as a percentage of their expenditures. Thus, while more studies 
are needed, the existing evidence supports an inference that anticompetitive 
practices in mass retail goods likely contribute to inequality. 
D. Market Inefficiency 
Some portion of supracompetitive pricing never becomes profit and 
instead is lost to inefficient business activities. These additional expendi-
tures include labor, technology, inventory management, rebate processing, 
pricing label adjustments, and product and packaging reconfiguration.  
For example, the practice of naming mattresses differently across retailers 
requires additional expenditures on labeling, recordkeeping, and merchandising 
a greater number of products. If the actual mattress is made slightly 
 
219 See generally Anandi Mani et al., Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function, 341 SCI. 976 (2013) 
(implementing an experiment designed to show that similarly sized financial challenges can have 
different cognitive impacts on the poor and the wealthy). 
220 See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 1. 
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differently to justify the different name, inventory or production costs are 
also raised.221  
Inefficient expenditures also likely come from the need for more computing 
power and quantitatively trained employees to implement practices that 
keep prices above competitive levels. Some economies of scale result from 
using big data capabilities for expenditures unrelated to supracompetitive 
pricing.222 However, assessing the success of the anticompetitive activities 
mentioned above requires additional investments in people and technology 
to conduct behavioral decisionmaking experiments, analyze the results, and 
implement purchasing, merchandising, and pricing insights generated by 
those studies.223  
The total amount of such inefficiency is not readily quantifiable. But an 
increase of 5% due to supracompetitive pricing for retail goods would 
amount to about an extra $130 billion spent annually.224 Some portion of this 
is dissipated through inefficient business activity, while much of the rest 
may contribute to income inequality. When these effects are combined with 
the hit to household budgets and the extra time spent shopping, the harm 
from the sector’s anticompetitive practices is potentially substantial. 
 IV. EXISTING INSTITUTIONS ARE INSUFFICIENT TO PREVENT HARM 
The principal actors governing the retail sector—legislatures, private 
litigants, and agencies—have proven inadequate to prevent the consumer 
 
221 For example, a less interchangeable inventory could require that more inventory be kept 
on hand, adjustments to be made to the manufacturing process, or a longer lead time to fulfill 
orders. Each of these is inefficient for the consumer if the sole purpose is to make it more difficult 
for consumers to compare prices across stores. 
222 See MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 73, at 13 (“Using big data will become a key basis of 
competition for existing companies, and will create new competitors who are able to attract 
employees that have the critical skills for a big data world.”). 
223 See O’Donnell & Meehan, supra note 36 (pointing out that many stores have “their own 
analytics departments”). By analogy, during a period of large-scale adoption of information 
technologies and scale that would be expected to bring increased efficiency, efficiency in the 
financial sector has instead remained stagnant over the past 30 years. See Thomas Philippon, Has 
the U.S. Finance Industry Become Less Efficient? On the Theory and Measurement of Financial 
Intermediation 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18,077, 2014), available at 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~tphilipp/papers/Finance_Efficiency.pdf (finding that “the unit cost of 
intermediation is about as high today as it was at the turn of the 20th century”). One commonly 
mentioned impact of predatory practices in the consumer finance industry, which grew significantly 
over this same period, is a decrease in market efficiency. See Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory 
Pricing and Recoupment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1695, 1743 (2013) (asserting that predatory pricing 
causes market inefficiency); Willis, supra note 3, at 711 (concluding that “predatory lending became 
a problem in the late 1990s”). 
224 See supra note 1 (placing annual spending on goods at $2.6 trillion).  
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harm resulting from anticompetitive practices. All three have been hindered 
by the sophistication gap and resulting information asymmetries between 
them and consumer goods companies. Each is also institutionally designed 
in a way that increases the likelihood it will react too slowly to fast-moving 
markets. And while legislatures have passed some powerful consumer 
protection laws, federal regulators have applied those laws narrowly. This 
Part outlines the inadequacies of each of these actors. They are stuck in a 
similar rational actor, ex post paradigm, just as consumer finance regulators 
were before the 2008 financial crisis.  
A. Legislatures 
Legislatures at the national and local level have played an important role 
in expanding consumer protection laws. They have passed general laws 
prohibiting unfair and deceptive business practices, adding significantly to 
the minimal common law protections afforded consumers in the marketplace.225 
In passing these general laws, legislatures have acknowledged their own 
institutional limitations by largely leaving the details to agencies and 
courts.226 
This delegation of authority is especially warranted because legislatures 
operate too slowly for fast-moving markets. Supracompetitive pricing 
practices are developed at a rapid pace—new practices are continually tested 
and can be rolled out in days. Legislatures, on the other hand, tend to take 
months, if not years, to move from the identification of a potential problem 
to the implementation of a solution.227 The lengthy process and negotiations 
among typically hundreds of elected officials, often across two chambers, is 
better suited for occasional action, not the kind of regular updating of rules 
needed in the consumer goods sector. While the legislative machinery 
slowly gears up for action, billions of potentially harmful transactions occur 
and the new legislation likely ignores the latest business practices. Indeed, 
Congress recognized this limitation when creating the FTC, as it declined 
 
225 Those principal protections were for fraud, misrepresentation, and unconscionability. See 
infra subsection IV.B.1.a.  
226 See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Consumer Protec-
tion Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 8 (2005) (describing the broad authority granted to the FTC to 
regulate unlawful and deceptive consumer activity under the Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938). 
227 See Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest Is Silence: Chevron Deference, 
Agency Jurisdiction, And Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1535 n.231 (discussing 
“institutional obstacles that inherently slow the legislative process”).  
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to “undertake an endless task” of specifying the list of prohibited unfair and 
deceptive acts.228  
Legislatures also lack the information necessary to pass legislation that 
would speak to many of the sector’s potentially anticompetitive practices. 
They rely mostly on publicly available information or on advocacy groups to 
identify problems and potential solutions. This is insufficient in part 
because some of the subtle ways that firms are raising prices may be unob-
servable without looking under the hood of institutions’ experimental 
machinery.229 Nor will the results of those experiments always make it clear 
whether behavioral market failures exist, thus requiring follow-up analyses 
or surveys—which legislatures often lack the relevant expertise to conduct. 
Political obstacles also limit legislatures’ ability to respond regularly to 
consumers’ interests. As leading political science and legal scholars have 
argued, legislatures acting alone will incur biases such as failing to update 
laws of general public benefit and demonstrating favoritism toward powerful 
groups.230 Consumer goods companies represent a highly concentrated and 
influential interest group that exerts considerable pressure on legislatures. 
In 2012, Walmart alone spent $8.68 million on lobbying expenses and $3.55 
million on campaign contributions.231  
Although legislatures are not capable of addressing the lack of consumer 
protection in the consumer goods sector, they can play an important role in 
containing anticompetitive practices. Indeed, at times legislatures have 
followed up on unfair and deceptive acts with more specific legislation 
advancing effective shopper-level decisionmaking for consumer goods. For 
example, some state legislatures have mandated unit pricing,232 restricted 
practices that made it difficult for consumers to redeem rebates, promoted 
disclaimers in warranties, and ensured that retailers sell an item at an 
“original” price for a minimum amount of time before subsequently offering 
 
228 See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 226, at 8 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1142, at 19 (1914) 
(Conf. Rep.)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
229 See supra Section I.C. 
230 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 
1530 (1987) (“[T]he legislature acting alone will be subject to three biases which undermine the 
overall legitimacy of government: failure to enact or update public interest laws, avoidance of hard 
choices, and favoritism directed at power groups.”). 
231 Al Norman, Wal-Mart’s ‘Invisible Army’ of Lobbyists, HUFFINGTON POST (July 22, 2013, 
9:29 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/al-norman/walmart-lobbyists_b_3632526.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/3FL5-TY5R. 
232 Eleven states and territories, along with many cities have passed mandatory unit pricing 
on retail shelves; ten more states have some form of unit pricing laws or regulations. See A Guide to 
Retail Pricing Laws and Regulations, supra note 99. 
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a “discount” price.233 And as practices evolve, legislative clarification may be 
needed. However, legislatures are not designed to monitor the fast-paced, 
technologically and scientifically sophisticated practices of the modern 
consumer goods sector.  
B. Courts 
Like legislative bodies, courts are not designed to reduce information 
asymmetries and technical deficits vis-à-vis mass retailers, and they are slow 
to catch up with market changes ex post. As discussed in this section, 
private lawsuits face additional challenges due to limitations in the underlying 
doctrine and procedure. Doctrinally, many states provide for private 
lawsuits for unfair and deceptive acts. Common law doctrine, however, is 
largely inapplicable. Procedurally, it is typically unfeasible to aggregate 
unfair and deceptive acts claims into a single lawsuit. Thus, while lawsuits 
can provide redress for a small subset of clearer harms, they are inadequate 
for addressing sector-wide supracompetitive pricing.  
1. Doctrinal Basis for Lawsuits 
 a. Common Law Doctrine 
The common law provides consumers with two main doctrines for 
protection against anticompetitive practices: unconscionability under 
contract law and the torts of fraud or misrepresentation.234 These doctrines 
are inadequate for providing consumers with means for redress in the 
consumer goods sector without significant evolution.  
First, unconscionability is fundamentally inadequate because its primary 
remedy is to rescind contracts. This is impractical for practices diffused 
throughout a large number of goods purchased and used. Indeed, in most 
instances consumers could simply return goods if they saw a problem before 
using the items.  
Second, substantive unconscionability has traditionally had a high bar of 
impropriety. Courts have typically held a term to be unconscionable if it 
“shocks the conscience,” or is “so one-sided as to be oppressive.”235 Harmful 
 
233 See Pitofsky et al., supra note 147, at 63 (noting that at least forty states and the District of 
Columbia have statutes relating to fictitious pricing, including statutes requiring the seller to offer 
a product for a “reasonably substantial period of time” at the original price (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).   
234 DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CONSUMER LAW, at xxiii 
(7th ed. 2013).   
235 Korobkin, supra note 3, at 1273 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
  
1364 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 1311 
 
terms in credit card and mortgage cases have typically not been found to 
reach this high bar.236 Given the similarities in anticompetitive practices, 
but the lower salience of the harm in goods than in finance, the doctrine 
offers little hope in the consumer goods realm.  
Scholars and courts agree that procedural unconscionability is also poorly 
suited to practices related to behavioral economics. It does, however, 
provide a relevant consideration: the relative sophistication of parties. 
Courts see a large sophistication gap between the parties—as determined by 
factors such as education level—as weighing in favor of invalidating the 
transaction upon suit by the less sophisticated party.237 This factor alone is 
of little use to litigants, as it would potentially invalidate most modern 
consumer transactions if judges were to conclude a large sophistication gap 
exists between consumers and retailers. Thus, unconscionability is largely 
inapplicable in its current form though it provides some common law 
foundation for a consumer protection doctrine that focuses on the sophisti-
cation gap between firms and consumers.238 
Nor do common law fraud and misrepresentation apply to most anti-
competitive practices in the modern consumer goods context. Misrepresen-
tation under the common law typically requires that the seller knows of a 
misrepresentation and intends to misrepresent.239 This is a high bar that 
often discouraged consumers from using the doctrine in private suits against 
sellers—even those who allegedly made a false or misleading statement.240 
Supracompetitive pricing does not usually rely on even false or misleading 
statements—indeed, false advertising has been vigorously prosecuted by the 
FTC and state entities while supracompetitive pricing practices have gone 
 
236 Id. at 1278 (asserting that unconscionability tests are not “well-tailored” to the challenges 
created by bounded rationality); Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The 
Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 3 (2012) (describing the 
weaknesses in the unconscionability doctrine as “discourag[ing] decision makers from inquiring 
whether boilerplate [contract] terms produce unacceptably harsh results”). 
237 See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 3, at 1266 (“Courts also sometimes find involuntariness 
sufficient to support a finding of procedural unconscionability when the buyer is poor, uneducated, 
or unsophisticated relative to the seller.”).  
238 For proposals on how unconscionability might be expanded to cover non-salient contract 
terms, see Korobkin, supra note 3, at 1278-90. 
239 See Ryan P. O’Quinn & Thomas Watterson, Fair Is Fair—Reshaping Alaska’s Unfair Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Act, 28 ALASKA L. REV. 295, 297 (2011) (explaining that “a 
plaintiff must show that the defendant made a false representation, knew of the falsehood, and 
intended to misrepresent the information” in order to establish fraud or intentional misrepresenta-
tion under the common law). 
240 See Stephen Buckingham, Comment, Distinguishing Deception and Fraud: Expanding the 
Scope of Statutory Remedies Available in Pennsylvania for Violations of State Consumer Protection Law, 
78 TEMP. L. REV. 1025, 1027 (2005) (describing the barriers to litigating valid consumer 
protection claims under common law fraud).  
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ignored.241 Instead, supracompetitive pricing relies on making it more 
difficult for consumers to find the relevant information or on consumers’ 
inability to rationally process the information that is available to them. 
Thus, there is no strong basis for claiming sellers are misrepresenting in 
most such instances as the common law concept is traditionally applied. 
Tort law is most applicable in the context of remedies. Tort law remedies 
are typically awarded in the form of monetary damages for the harm done. 
This would potentially enable monetary awards for the cumulative mone-
tary impact of many practices, each causing small amounts of harm from 
elevated prices. 
Thus, the common law offers no clear avenue for effective private lawsuits 
against sellers of consumer goods for supracompetitive pricing. Elements of 
the needed doctrine can be drawn by combining remedies from tort law and 
arguments for breach of contract from the law of unconscionability. This 
potentially becomes important with respect to the FTC’s power to enforce 
unfair and deceptive acts, discussed below, which courts have explicitly stated 
should be interpreted by drawing on common law principles.242  
b. Statutes Prohibiting Unfair and Deceptive Acts  
A more promising doctrine for protecting consumers comes through 
statutes prohibiting unfair and deceptive acts. All states allow for private 
actions by consumers for violations of unfair and deceptive acts, although 
courts have held that the Federal Trade Commission Act does not allow for 
private actions.243 In some states, local advocates have convinced state courts 
to adopt divergent interpretations of the Act’s authority.244 But as discussed 
below, under the FTC’s analogous authority, the doctrine likely provides the 
courts with a legal basis for prohibiting practices that lead to supracompeti-
tive pricing in consumer goods.245  
 
241 See, e.g., Dahlberg Elecs., Inc., 88 F.T.C. 319, 331-35 (1976) (ordering hearing aid manufac-
turer to cease advertising its products with false and misleading claims). 
242 See Patricia P. Bailey & Michael Pertschuk, The Law of Deception: The Past as Prologue, 33 
AM. U. L. REV. 849, 871 n.108 (1984) (citing cases applying the common law test of unfair 
competition to claims under the FTC Act).  
243 Matthew A. Edwards, The Law, Marketing and Behavioral Economics of Consumer Rebates, 
12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 362, 398 (2007). 
244 See Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 758 
(2011) (“[S]tates and private parties acting under state law persuaded state courts to adopt 
divergent interpretations of unfairness, and to reach an increasingly wide range of conduct 
‘adjudged unfair under current commercial mores.’”).  
245 See infra subsection IV.C.2.a. 
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2. Procedural Designs for Lawsuits 
Where the doctrine permits lawsuits, procedural challenges erect addi-
tional barriers. The best hope for procedurally feasible lawsuits comes in the 
form of class actions, which enable litigants to aggregate claims.246  
The ability to aggregate claims is important because the direct harm to 
any one consumer from any one retailer is likely relatively small.247 An 
individual consumer’s spending is often spread out among many retailers—
supermarkets, department stores, drug stores, and so on. Even if an esti-
mated several hundred dollars of surplus expenditures were concentrated at 
one retailer, empirical studies suggest that a very small percentage of such 
consumers would even contact a lawyer, let alone sue, for such amounts.248 
In the supracompetitive pricing context, consumers would almost certainly 
not sue since they are unaware they are impacted by the vast majority of 
such practices.249 
Granted, it is conceivable that a subset of consumers could individually 
bring sizeable cases if they do most of their shopping across categories at 
mass retailers such as Walmart or Target. However, as large as mass retailers 
such as Walmart and Target are, they are, nevertheless, only a fraction of the 
overall retail market. Other retailers that constitute a smaller percentage of 
individual consumers’ spending would likely not be feasible to sue in such a 
manner. This would leave large portions of the retail sector free to engage in 
anticompetitive practices. And individual suits could still make anticompeti-
tive practices profitable for Target and Walmart, as infrequent shoppers 
would be less likely to bring such suits. 
Also, questionable practices are spread out among retailers and manufac-
turers. For a consumer who incurs hundreds of dollars of additional costs 
from shopping at a particular retailer, some of that amount would be 
attributable to numerous manufacturers that produced the hundreds of 
 
246 See Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and 
Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 993 (2002) (“Class action litigation is 
supposed to protect members of society by allowing them to aggregate claims that are too small to 
litigate individually.”).  
247 For some of the most expensive consumer goods—such as automobiles, luxury items, and 
high-end electronics—individual lawsuits might provide redress, but even in such suits the legal 
case can be challenging. See, e.g., Fields v. Yarborough Ford, Inc., 414 S.E.2d 164, 167 (S.C. 1992) 
(denying plaintiff relief for claim of unfair trade practices regarding the sale of a pickup truck 
because the plaintiff failed to prove actual damages). 
248 See Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, Does Fraud Pay? An Empirical Analysis of 
Attorney’s Fees Provisions in Consumer Fraud Statutes, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 483, 490 & n.15 (2008) 
(sharing empirical results that only 2.4% of consumers who believed they had been the victims of 
fraud even contacted a lawyer—the median loss amongst the group was $220). 
249 See supra subsection II.A.1.b. 
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products that the consumer purchased. This further undermines the efficacy 
of even class action lawsuits for supracompetitive pricing due to the need to 
choose between either impractically complex litigation or an incomplete list 
of defendants that excludes manufacturers.  
Nor are class actions even an option for many plaintiffs. They are simply 
not allowed by statutes and courts for unfair and deceptive claims in many 
states.250 This would mean that relying on class actions would leave 
supracompetitive pricing practices intact in many states. Also, the scale 
would be lessened for any given lawsuit as many states have resisted aggre-
gating claimants across state lines.251  
Even in states that allow class actions, courts have often denied class 
certification in consumer cases when the group lacks common issues of 
fact.252 In one rebate case, for example, the judge found that each litigant’s 
history was unique because there were various reasons why a given claimant 
might have not received the rebate—such as being late or failing to provide 
the necessary information.253 This suggests that class certification would be 
unlikely in many jurisdictions for supracompetitive pricing suits. Given the 
large number of subtle practices that combine to influence different 
consumers in different ways, many courts would likely find that the mecha-
nisms for inducing supracompetitive pricing would be different for different 
consumers. Additionally, in the mass retail context, different consumers 
purchase different baskets of items, thus potentially constituting different 
issues of fact.  
Beyond class actions, several other procedural designs might help make 
lawsuits for supracompetitive pricing more feasible. Many states provide 
minimum damages awards, so that even if the harm to an individual 
consumer were smaller than the statutory amount, they could still recover 
between $25 and $2000 depending on the state.254 Some states have private 
 
250 See Edwards, supra note 243, at 402 (“Several states explicitly prohibit [consumer protec-
tion] class actions, while other states’ courts have interpreted their [consumer protection] statutes 
to reach this result.”). 
251 Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 226, at 17 (“[T]he vast differences in the application of 
state laws makes it particularly inappropriate for courts to certify multi-state class actions alleging 
[consumer protection act] claims or to apply the [consumer protection act] of one state to conduct 
that occurred in another state.”). 
252 See Edwards, supra note 243, at 402 (describing a case in which consumer protection class 
certification was denied because “common issues of fact did not predominate among class 
members”). 
253 Id. (citing Stone v. CompuServe Interactive Servs., Inc., 804 So.2d 383, 388-89 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2001)). 
254 See Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1501, 1522 (2009) (“[A]t least eighteen states allow successful consumer plaintiffs to 
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attorney general statutes to empower consumers to affordably bring lawsuits 
for unfair acts that cover plaintiff attorneys’ fees and even to sue for injunc-
tive relief.255 Although such procedural mechanisms help, they would likely 
only work in high-value cases or in combination with class actions. Large 
amounts in controversy provide the necessary scale to justify what would be 
considerable trial costs such as advanced quantitative analyses needed to 
establish supracompetitive pricing.  
Thus, the procedural barriers to private lawsuits are, overall, considerable. 
Class actions would be essential for redress but are confined to certain 
geographies. Where available, class certification would prove challenging; 
not all defendants could easily be brought before the court and advanced 
analyses would prove prohibitively expensive. Nor would an ex post process 
be sufficiently expedient to keep up with fast-changing markets. Thus, 
judicial avenues are unlikely to succeed even in individual cases and are 
inadequate for addressing the issue on a national level. 
C. Agencies 
As currently configured, agencies are not set up to meaningfully curtail 
sector-wide supracompetitive pricing in consumer goods. State agencies can 
at best play a supplemental role in the face of national retailers with centralized 
control over vast territories. And at the federal level, the FTC’s impact is 
limited by its self-imposed structure as an ex post enforcement-driven 
agency.  
1. State Regulatory Efforts 
Unable to deal with a large volume of consumer complaints often related 
to local businesses, the FTC initiated a nationwide effort in the early 1970s 
to convince states to adopt statutes prohibiting unfair and deceptive practices.256 
Many did so throughout the 1960s and 1970s, modeling their statutes after 
 
recover minimum damages . . . to encourage plaintiffs to litigate consumer protection viola-
tions . . . .”).  
255 See id. (“Most states allow plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees incurred in bringing a 
successful action under their consumer protection statutes.”); Rebecca Eschler Russell, Unlawful 
Versus Unfair: A Comparative Analysis of Oregon’s and Connecticut’s Statutes Encouraging Private 
Attorneys General To Protect Consumers, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 673, 673 (2011) (“[T]o encourage 
private enforcement of states’ consumer protection laws, state statutes provide for attorney fees, 
costs, minimum damages awards, and punitive damages in addition to actual damages or equitable 
relief.” (footnote omitted)). 
256 See O’Quinn & Watterson, supra note 239, at 301 (noting that the FTC developed a model 
statute for states, the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law). 
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that of the FTC.257 Consequently, there is significant overlap between state 
and federal regulatory authority in the consumer goods sector. State 
agencies can meaningfully supplement federal regulation in the sector by 
paying closer attention to more localized operations. However, state regula-
tors are mismatched in efforts to oversee national retailers that came to 
dominate the retail sector in the 1990s and 2000s. 
The retail sector has undergone massive consolidation in recent decades. 
In 1980, when much of the FTC’s regulatory approach took shape, Walmart 
had only 276 stores and Amazon did not exist.258 As of 2014, Walmart has 
over 11,000 stores worldwide, and Amazon is set to surpass $100 billion in 
annual sales.259 Retailers now determine nationwide pricing and selling 
practices from central headquarters that are located throughout the 
country.260 Understanding the advanced technologies, quantitative analytics, 
and scientific experiments that drive any large company’s practices requires 
investing regulatory resources that must be justified by the benefit to the 
regulator’s constituency.  
Even the most populous state, California, would find it difficult to justify 
building what would essentially be a national regulatory operation when its 
constituents constitute only 12% of the population that national retailers 
serve.261 In an era of Internet sales and national vendors, a comprehensive 
solution would require cross-state action.262 
 
257 See id. at 302 (recounting how forty-four states passed some version of the FTC’s model 
act). Congress granted the FTC broad authority to regulate unfair and deceptive acts and practices 
in 1938. See Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 447, 52 Stat. 111.  
258 History Timeline, supra note 86. 
259 Id.; see also Krystina Gustafson, Time to Close Wal-Mart Stores? Analysts Think So, CNBC 
(Jan. 31, 2014, 3:21 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101380735, archived at http://perma.cc/9RRF-
HXXQ (discussing Wal-Mart’s massive growth in the mid-2000s, when it opened an average of 
five stores a week); David Streitfeld, Amazon Spends and Grows, but Still Wants for Money, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/24/technology/amazon-spends-and-
grows-but-still-wants-for-money.html?_r=0, archived at http:/perma.cc/UE75-P6PE (noting that 
Amazon’s projected revenue will exceed $100 billion in 2015).  
260 Based on the author’s work as a consultant for national retailers and consumer goods 
manufacturers. 
261 California residents are approximately 12% of the national population according to 2013 
Census figures. State & County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts. 
census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5WUF-EW84. 
262 State regulation of national retailers also makes little sense from a market efficiency 
standpoint. Regulatory burden is minimized by having standardized rules across state lines. For 
example, implementing a nationwide regulatory approach rather than a hodgepodge of state 
practices requiring different internal institutional systems and compliance expertise would allow 
regulators to take advantage of economies of scale in labeling and organizational practices. 
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2. The FTC 
The FTC has broad statutory powers to regulate supracompetitive pricing 
in consumer goods. It has not, however, exercised those powers. Some legal 
scholars have traced FTC consumer protection inaction on behavioral 
pricing to the deregulatory influences of the Reagan administration in the 
early 1980s.263 This Section articulates an explanation missing from the 
literature: the FTC’s design as a predominately ex post enforcement agency 
without supervisory capabilities. 
 a. The FTC Has the Statutory Authority to Regulate Supracompetitive Pricing 
Practices 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to examine whether the FTC 
has the authority to regulate supracompetitive pricing practices in goods. 
Congress gave the FTC broad powers to regulate harmful business practices 
in the consumer goods sector under the Federal Trade Commission Act 
(FTCA) authority to prohibit “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”264 This 
authority includes the ability to write substantive rules.265 The FTC has 
since its early years exercised its unfairness powers with restraint. Conse-
quently, there is a lack of clarity about the doctrine.266 Nonetheless, the 
FTC’s authority to regulate the market’s evolution toward supracompetitive 
pricing is supported by statutory language, policy, and case law. 
i. Unfairness Statutory Language 
The FTCA’s definition of unfair was codified by Congress in 1994 as 
governing acts that are “likely to cause [1] substantial injury to consumers 
 
263 See Norman I. Silber, Reasonable Behavior at the CFPB, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. 
L. 87, 93-94 (2012) (noting that FTC commissioners appointed by President Reagan “embraced 
less market regulation”); see also WHALEY, supra note 234, at xxiv (attributing the lack of 
regulatory action to the Reagan administration’s policies). 
264 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). 
265 See id. § 57(a) (granting the Commission the power to prescribe rules and statements of 
policy); Nat’l Petrol. Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that the 
FTC has been given statutory authority to promulgate rules); Charles H. Koch, Jr. & Beth 
Martin, FTC Rulemaking Through Negotiation, 61 N.C. L. REV. 275, 279 (1983) (recounting the 
history behind the FTC’s legislative rulemaking authority); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn 
Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 
549-57 (2002) (documenting the evolution of the FTC’s legislative rulemaking powers). 
266 See Stephen Calkins, FTC Unfairness: An Essay, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1935, 1937 (2000) 
(writing that the applicable statute gives only “an illusion of precision”). 
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which is [2] not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and [3] not 
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”267  
A straightforward application of these three elements of unfair and 
deceptive acts and practices seems to fit consumer goods supracompetitive 
pricing. First, the harm from supracompetitive pricing can cause substantial 
injury to a large number of individual consumers. The rough estimates from 
field and laboratory studies, as well as industry representations, suggest that 
supracompetitive pricing has the potential to cost individual households 
hundreds, if not thousands, of dollars annually.268 While this harm is 
cumulative over thousands of individual product purchases, most of which 
are quite small, the FTC has issued policy guidance stating that a substan-
tial injury to consumers could be shown by a practice causing “small harm to 
a large number of people.”269 Since millions of consumers shop at national 
retailers engaging in supracompetitive pricing practices, the requirement of 
substantial injury is met by a plain reading of the statutory language. 
A slightly harder case is whether the harm caused by supracompetitive 
pricing practices is “not reasonably avoidable.”270 As discussed above, the 
common presumption is that consumers could easily spend more time 
researching or paying closer attention. Yet the empirical literature on 
behavioral decisionmaking biases suggests many consumers are unaware of 
retailers’ practices because those practices affect more automatic, heuristic-
filled thinking processes.271 Moreover, a growing body of behavioral 
economics research suggests that most people, including those who are 
highly educated, can be prompted to make very basic cognitive mistakes by 
simple mechanisms such as clever wording.272 It follows that consumers 
cannot avoid making decisions influenced by some amount of bias or other 
psychological limitation. In the case of practices that increase search costs, 
the consumer must decide between either paying more money or spending 
more time. A choice between two harms does not involve “reasonably 
avoidable” harm. 
 
267 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012). 
268 See supra Section III.A. 
269 Letter from Michael Pertschuk et al., Comm’rs, FTC, to Sens. Wendell H. Ford & John 
C. Danforth, FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness n.12 (Dec. 17, 1980), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness.  
270 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 
271 See supra Section I.B. 
272 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 21 (providing examples of the wording of 
questions leading people to incorrect answers).  
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The third definitional component, that acts not be “outweighed by coun-
tervailing benefits to consumers or to competition,”273 sets up an important 
cost–benefit analysis that depends on the policy considered. An effective 
analysis of each practice would require a thorough market analysis leveraging 
field-validated experimental results about how firm behavior intersects with 
consumers’ ability to make rational and informed decisions. Nonetheless, it is 
difficult to imagine such an analysis yielding countervailing benefits to 
consumers or markets in most of the practices mentioned above, such as 
selling products for only a limited time at an original price then later 
providing a large discount or creating different names for the same product 
at different stores. Nor is it clear how “consumers or competition” benefit 
from imperceptible downsizing of product quantity.  
Thus, a straightforward application of the FTC’s statutory authority 
suggests the agency can regulate the types of anticompetitive pricing 
practices discussed in this Article.  
ii. Unfairness Policy 
Beyond the letter of the codification, the FTC has provided further 
guidance for evolving the doctrine of fairness, stating that even if a practice 
was not previously unlawful, it will be considered unfair if it “offends public 
policy as it has been established by statutes, common law, or otherwise—
whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common 
law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness.”274 Policy is more 
likely to be viewed as a justification for applying the FTC’s unfairness 
powers to a given context if the policy is “clear and well-established.”275 One 
recent statute, in particular, meets this high bar for considering supracompet-
itive pricing unfair under public policy: the 2010 Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank), in which Congress, 
with bipartisan support, established the CFPB.276  
The Act grants the CFPB the authority to regulate consumer financial 
products with essentially the same language as that used to grant similar 
powers to the FTC for consumer goods, giving it the power to prohibit 
“unfair” and “deceptive” practices.277 It has been widely concluded that 
 
273 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 
274 Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 61 (1972).  
275 Matthew W. Sawchak & Kip D. Nelson, Defining Unfairness in “Unfair Trade Practices,” 90 
N.C. L. REV. 2033, 2059 (2012).  
276 See Brady Dennis, Senate Passes Landmark Bill in Triumph for Obama, WASH. POST, July 
16, 2010, at A1 (reporting on Congress’s passage of the Dodd–Frank Act). 
277 See John E. Villafranco & Kristin A. McPartland, New Agency, New Authority: An Update 
on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2012, at 1, 4-6 (describing 
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Congress established the agency based largely on a behavioral law and 
economics argument.278  
The CFPB’s actions are also consistent with the conclusion that prohib-
iting unfair and deceptive practices covers firms that exploit consumer 
limitations. The CFPB has implemented legislation that requires transfer-
ors of money to make disclosures that would prevent consumers from being 
surprised by “hidden fees,” even when a consumer, with enough effort, could 
have independently acquired that information.279 As discussed above, mass 
consumer goods retailers arguably sell products at higher prices in a manner 
analogous to hidden fees in complex contractual products.280 
Thus, Congress explicitly stated that the FTC’s unfairness doctrine 
should evolve in accordance with how unfairness is viewed in other statutes. 
Because the recent Dodd–Frank Act is being applied to similar anticompeti-
tive pricing practices in consumer finance, this adds further support for 
concluding the FTC can regulate such practices in consumer goods.  
iii. Unfairness Case Law 
Because the FTC does not bring unfairness suits for supracompetitive 
pricing, there is little direct case law on the agency’s authority in this area. 
However, the D.C. Circuit has made it clear that the FTC was tasked with 
evolving its unfairness doctrine on an “incremental, evolutionary basis” to 
 
similarities between the FTC and CFPB’s authority to regulate unfair and deceptive practices). 
Dodd–Frank also added the authority to regulate “abusive” practices, but the CFPB has not 
exercised such authority and has no plans to do so. See id. at 6 (quoting CFPB Director Richard 
Cordray as saying the meaning of “abusive” practices is a puzzle to the agency). The implication is 
that the CFPB’s activities have covered only unfair and deceptive practices, which situates it as 
illustrative on the FTC’s unfair and deceptive powers. 
278 See Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at War with 
Each Other, 121 YALE L.J. 2216, 2220 (2012) (“Dodd–Frank . . . represents the arrival of behavioral 
law and economics as the intellectual centerpiece of the current administration’s approach.”); 
Rosch, supra note 10, at 1 (noting that the establishment of the CFPB was “based—at least in 
part—on behavioral economics theory”). 
279 See Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Adopts Rule to Protect Consumers Sending Money Inter-
nationally (Jan. 20, 2012), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/consumer-
financial-protection-bureau-adopts-rule-to-protect-consumers-sending-money-internationally/ 
(explaining that Dodd–Frank increased the scope of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act to increase 
protections for consumers). 
280 As Elizabeth Warren, Oren Bar-Gill, and others have observed, for contract products 
such as cell phone plans and credit cards, firms often sell as a package both services with prices 
that are accurately perceived (such as the monthly cell phone plan bill) and services with prices 
that are misperceived (such as underestimating the costs of a hike in per-minute fees after the 
plan’s base minutes are used). See Bar-Gill, supra note 111, at 1106-07 (discussing the impact of 
complexity on mortgage buyers). See generally Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 6 (describing the 
danger posed to consumers by complex credit card contracts). 
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adapt to changing markets.281 This would suggest that as firms increasingly 
use practices capitalizing on behavioral economics, the agency’s authority 
should evolve to cover those practices. Additionally, the case law in related 
areas lends support to the conclusion that the FTC has authority over such 
practices.  
The strongest argument against FTC authority in the case law is on the 
question of whether the harm is “reasonably avoidable” by comparison 
shopping. On many occasions, courts and the FTC have emphasized that 
free and informed market decisions are the best mechanism for consumer 
protection.282 And, consumers do have great freedom to travel to various 
stores and to shop online in choosing goods. 
However, early courts also found that the unfairness doctrine could be 
used to prohibit selling practices that capitalize on consumers’ inadequate 
decisionmaking. For example, in FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Brother, Inc., the 
Supreme Court found unfairness in candy packaging materials that led 
consumers to purchase an inferior product by leaving the price and amount 
of product to chance.283 The Court reached this determination even though 
the packaging made the element of chance abundantly clear.284 A modern 
equivalent could be found in the subtle downsizing of product content 
without changing the packaging; even though the contents are clearly 
labeled, the consumer would be getting less than expected based on previous 
purchases.285 
More recently, the case law has reiterated that practices undermining 
decisionmaking fall within the purview of the unfairness doctrine. In 1980, 
the FTC issued a statement, defining the reasonably avoidable test as 
follows:  
[I]t has long been recognized that certain types of sales techniques may 
prevent consumers from effectively making their own decisions, and that 
corrective action may then become necessary. Most of the Commission’s 
unfairness matters are brought under these circumstances. They are 
brought, not to second-guess the wisdom of particular consumer decisions, 
 
281 Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 982 (D.C.  Cir. 1985).  
282 See FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150, 1158 (9th Cir. 2010) (“In determining whether 
consumers’ injuries were reasonably avoidable, courts look to whether the consumers had a free 
and informed choice.”). 
283 See FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Brother, Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 307-08, 314 (1934) (holding 
packaging that led consumers to pay a price or receive an amount of candy determined by chance 
to be a violation of unfair practices). 
284 Id. at 307-08.  
285 See supra Section II.A. 
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but rather to halt some form of seller behavior that unreasonably creates or 
takes advantage of an obstacle to the free exercise of consumer decisionmaking.286 
This definition was later adopted by courts287 and has become part of the 
accepted definition of the FTC’s test for unfairness.288 Courts have concluded 
that, in determining whether injuries were reasonably avoidable, courts 
should “look to whether the consumers had a free and informed choice.”289 
In American Financial Services Ass’n v. FTC, the court cited a number of 
considerations consistent with supracompetitive pricing practices in holding 
that a financial institution had engaged in unfair practices in a credit 
contract.290 For example, the court suggested that the FTC could regulate 
business practices that caused consumers to “have little ability or incentive 
to shop for a better contract.”291 The court similarly suggested that the FTC 
could regulate practices that restricted consumers’ ability to shop by 
exploiting cognitive limitations such as through “fine print and technical 
language.”292 Together, these cases provide some—albeit indirect—support 
for concluding the doctrine of unfairness covers sales practices that contribute 
to consumer irrationality or information asymmetries.  
b. Ex Post Enforcement Focus Hinders FTC Consumer Protection 
Deregulatory ideology from the 1980s does not, by itself, explain the 
FTC’s inaction in the consumer goods sector. To be sure, the FTC underwent 
a tightening of regulatory activities starting in the early 1980s.293 But even 
before then the FTC rarely exercised its broad powers to regulate unfair 
business practices in the sector.294 Indeed, even during the 1980s, sellers of 
goods had far lower sophistication and goods markets were far less complex 
than they are today. Thus, the sector likely was less in need of consumer 
 
286 Pertschuk et al., supra note 269.  
287 See, e.g., Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 977-78 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (affirming 
the FTC’s finding of unfairness based not on individual consumer decisions, but on the behavior 
of creditors that took full control of the decision away from consumers). 
288 See Sawchak & Nelson, supra note 275, at 2061-62 (detailing the cases in which the FTC 
applied the “not reasonably avoidable” test). 
289 FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150, 1158 (9th Cir. 2010). 
290 Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n, 767 F.2d at 972-78.  
291 Id. at 977. 
292 Id. 
293 See Silber, supra note 263, at 93-94 (noting the deregulatory policies of the Reagan 
administration). 
294 See Calkins, supra note 266, at 1937 (explaining how the FTC has shied away from asserting 
claims). 
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protection during that period.295 Also, the FTC’s inaction in the sector has 
lasted over multiple administrations led by both parties. It has persisted 
through a financial crisis that largely discredited deregulatory ideology.  
Finally, the FTC’s more active role in other areas undermines a deregu-
latory explanation for inaction. Even during the height of the deregulatory 
Reagan era, the FTC vigorously prosecuted firms for easily identifiable 
anticompetitive practices, such as deceptive advertising in goods. And the 
FTC has demonstrated its willingness to pursue related anticompetitive 
practices in other sectors, such as consumer finance.296 
A more comprehensive explanation of FTC inaction requires examining 
its narrow ex post enforcement focus. The agency’s Bureau of Consumer 
Protection is largely staffed by lawyers and, in 2012, filed 109 legal actions 
while writing two rules.297 It rarely collects non-public information outside 
of formal legal investigations and consumer complaints.298 This overwhelming 
emphasis on litigation creates two main barriers to effective regulation. 
First, it constrains the FTC’s activity within the traditional common law 
confines vis-à-vis a tort-based focus on individual practices or a contract-like 
focus on individual products rather than evolving legal rules, as Congress 
intended, to meet sector-wide problems that transcend those narrow legal 
boxes. Second, by focusing on enforcement, the FTC collects information 
from firms primarily as part of legal investigations, rather than more 
 
295 An influential law review article at the time asserted that retailers were likely unable to 
overcome market constraints on their ability to exploit consumers’ lack of decisionmaking 
sophistication. See generally Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 162. These market constraints include 
the randomness of consumer error, which would sometimes direct unsophisticated consumers 
toward smart choices, and the protection provided by sophisticated shoppers. Id. at 663-65. 
296 See, e.g., Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1062-66 (1984) (finding tractor manufacturer 
engaged in unfair, albeit not deceptive, practices in warning labels by failing to disclose certain 
types of dangers); see also Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n, 767 F.2d at 962-64 (describing rules promulgated 
by the FTC that restrict anticompetitive practices in consumer finance lending); Bar-Gill & 
Warren, supra note 6, at 95-97 (describing the FTC’s motivation to protect consumers in consumer 
finance, despite limited authority). 
297 See Annual Highlights 2012–2013: Stats & Data 2012, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, 
https://www.ftc.gov/reports/annual-report-standard/ftc-2013/stats-data-2012 (last visited Mar. 21, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/43W5-AYLY (listing enforcement actions and rulemaking efforts 
for the year 2012).  
298 When the FTC has sought to collect firms’ non-publicly available information to better 
understand industry practices, it has done so through voluntary participation. See, e.g., FTC, 
SLOTTING ALLOWANCES IN THE RETAIL GROCERY INDUSTRY: SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
IN FIVE PRODUCT CATEGORIES, at ii (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/documents/reports/use-slotting-allowances-retail-grocery-industry/slottingallowancerpt031114.pdf 
(describing how the FTC wrote letters to nine companies voluntarily requesting data and 
documents after the Senate instructed the agency to study slotting allowances in the grocery 
industry). 
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regularly supervising institutions. Ex post enforcement inherently has an 
important role to play in consumer protection299 but overemphasizing it 
hinders effective regulation of consumer goods.  
i. Narrow Legal Analysis  
The FTC’s litigation mindset causes it to focus narrowly on either indi-
vidual practices or individual products in its analysis of consumer goods. 
This maps a more traditional legal analysis of finding the particular act that 
caused a tort or the particular set of terms or clauses that make a contract 
problematic. This narrow focus goes further with individual practices, such 
as deceptive advertising. And it works better with individual products 
complex enough to combine many different practices or features that could 
confuse a consumer, such as mortgages or credit cards.300 But the narrow 
product or practice focus misses the type of systemic problem posed by the 
consumer goods sector, in which the significance lies not in any one practice 
or product, but in the combination of institutional practices over an array of 
products. A narrow analysis of the problem also hinders development of 
broad solutions. 
The FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection’s organizational structure 
reflects the paradigm through which it analyzes potential harms. Three of 
its seven divisions are organized around practices that stem from tort law: 
Privacy and Identity Protection, Advertising Practices (focused on false 
advertising), and Marketing Practices (focusing on consumer fraud).301 One 
of the divisions is organized around a contract-driven sector, the Division of 
Financial Practices.302 The other three divisions are Enforcement, Planning 
& Information, and Consumer & Business Education.303 
When the FTC discusses complexity, it is in the context of individual 
products.304 While FTC leadership has acknowledged individual consumer 
 
299 See Barr et al., supra note 7, at 39 (arguing for an “ex post, standards-based disclosure 
requirement” for the Truth in Lending Act). 
300 See Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n, 767 F.2d at 976 (identifying “a confluence of factors which 
create ‘an obstacle to the free exercise of consumer decisionmaking’ and which creditors are able to 
use to their advantage”). 
301 Our Divisions, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-
offices/bureau-consumer-protection/our-divisions (last visited Mar. 21, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/QN9B-A2UM.  
302 Id. 
303 Id. 
304 The focus on individual products is again exemplified by former FTC Chairman Rosch. 
In a speech urging caution in regulating for behavioral economics, Rosch noted that consumers 
may be “prisoners of circumstances” when “there is an asymmetry of information respecting a 
product or the terms of an offering as between sellers and buyers. That arguably happens most 
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goods such as computers might be complex enough to enable firms to 
exploit consumer decisionmaking, individual consumer goods are generally 
seen as lacking the requisite complexity.305 Consequently, outside of a few 
more complex products, most items sold in the sector are likely to receive 
FTC attention only if they are implicated in a practice analysis.  
The FTC’s practice analysis is also very individualistic. The FTC typi-
cally identifies and then prosecutes a single practice that has elements of 
common law torts, such as false advertising or invasion of privacy. Over a 
five-year period between 2009 and 2014, it brought over 30 enforcement 
actions against robocall violations in diverse sectors.306 In that period it took 
no enforcement action related to widespread supracompetitive pricing 
practices in consumer goods that potentially cost families hundreds of 
billions of dollars. This is perhaps the result to be expected under a tort 
paradigm, as no one salient anticompetitive practice in goods clearly 
constitutes a tort. 
This narrow focus also hinders identification of solutions. Given the 
large number of subtle practices that individually cause subtle harm, it 
would take a large number of rules to address the sector’s problems in a 
practice-by-practice or product-by-product manner. Moreover, economists 
have found that narrow regulatory interventions against supracompetitive 
pricing practices may actually produce anticompetitive effects.307 Scholars 
have proposed promising policy reforms for consumer irrationality and 
information asymmetries that would require a broader view of market 
failures than product or practice-specific analyses reveal.308 The FTC’s 
narrow litigation focus is in tension with the needed big-picture perspective 
on the sector’s problems and solutions. 
 
often when a product is complicated (think of personal computers) or when the terms of an 
offering are complex (think of financial derivatives).” Rosch, supra note 10, at 6. 
305 See id. at 7 (explaining that under certain circumstances, consumers simply do not make 
the effort to inform themselves and thus may not deserve government protection). 
306 See Robocalls and the Do Not Call Registry, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/do-not-call-registry/robocalls (last visited Mar. 
21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4TBX-ZJAG (listing press releases related to enforcement 
action taken by the FTC). In 2009, the FTC issued a rule prohibiting pre-recorded telemarketing 
calls (“robocalls”). See Press Release, FTC, New Rule Prohibiting Unwanted “Robocalls” to Take 
Effect on September 1 (Aug. 27, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2009/08/new-rule-prohibiting-unwanted-robocalls-take-effect-september-1. 
307 See Michele Piccione & Ran Spiegler, Price Competition Under Limited Comparability, 127 
Q.J. ECON. 97, 101 (2012) (concluding that “regulatory interventions that enhance comparability 
may lead to a less competitive market outcome”). 
308 See, e.g., Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 128, at 579-89 (proposing that firms selling contrac-
tual products broadly be required to know which contract terms are both unexpected and 
unfavorable and to prioritize disclosures accordingly). 
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ii. Information Asymmetries 
Probably the biggest obstacle preventing the FTC from regulating 
supracompetitive pricing has been a lack of information in two areas: firms’ 
internal operations and consumers’ decisionmaking process. Leading 
scholars on behaviorally informed regulation have emphasized the importance 
of consumer protection that builds on insight into both of these areas.309  
FTC Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch conceded in 2010 that the agency 
lacked the necessary information about the first of these—firms’ internal 
operations. He said that robust consumer protection would be needed if 
firms acted rationally in exploiting consumer irrationality and acknowledged 
that consumers act irrationally.310 However, Rosch stated that the missing 
piece in this equation is the open question of whether firms are deciding 
rationally.311 Thus, Rosch essentially acknowledged that an open question 
about firms’ internal operations prevents robust consumer protection from 
the kinds of practices discussed in this Article.  
Like financial regulators, the FTC has the power to collect information 
directly from firms that would enable it to answer this open question.312 
Indeed, in the 1970s, the FTC regularly collected non-public information 
from companies, such as profit figures according to line of business, and this 
information collection withstood legal challenges.313  
Yet, unlike financial regulators, the FTC does not exercise these powers. 
It does not regularly visit or request information from consumer goods 
institutions to assess general selling practices.314 Rather, staffed overwhelmingly 
 
309 See Barr et al., supra note 7, at 55 (“The challenge of behaviorally informed regulation, 
therefore, is to be well designed and insightful both about human behavior and about the 
behaviors that firms are likely to exhibit in response to both consumer behavior and regulation.”). 
310 Rosch, supra note 10, at 7. Rosch was previously the agency’s former Bureau of 
Consumer Protection director, so he is intimately familiar with the agency’s approach in this area. 
311 See id. (asking “whether irrationality just exists on the buy side” and noting that “[t]here 
are arguments why it may exist on the sell side as well”).  
312 See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement 
Authority, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-
authority (last updated July 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/9MCP-S9JB (“The Commission’s 
6(b) authority enables it to conduct wide-ranging economic studies that do not have a specific law 
enforcement purpose.”). 
313 See Note, The FTC’s Annual Line-of-Business Reporting Program, 1975 DUKE L.J. 389, 394-
96 (discussing courts’ expansive interpretation of FTC’s information collection powers, and the 
legality of previous programs aimed at collecting non-public information); see also Jonathan B. 
Baker, “Continuous” Regulatory Reform at the Federal Trade Commission, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 859, 
867-68 (1997) (discussing the history of the line of business program). 
314 See The Identity Crisis at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 100 Banking Rep. (BNA) 
No. 4, at 2-3 (Jan. 22, 2013) (explaining that the FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection’s 
interactions with the targets of its investigations are formal and adversarial rather than collaborative, 
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by lawyers, the FTC’s consumer protection arm mostly collects infor-
mation from institutions by serving papers as part of legal investiga-
tions.315 The FTC decides whether to open an investigation by relying 
mostly on publicly available information and consumer complaints.316  
Because information is being collected as part of a legal investigation, 
the institution being investigated understandably consults its lawyers. These 
lawyers help the firm to provide information minimally necessary for the 
particular investigation and in a manner least likely to provide evidence that 
its practices violate any law.317 The litigation-oriented environment thus 
decreases the helpfulness of the information, slows down its transfer, and 
requires more resources by regulators and firms to transfer information. 
Consequently, the FTC lacks the real-time inside information needed to 
more broadly understand the retail sector’s continually evolving, scientifically 
developed pricing practices.318  
This enforcement-driven process contrasts with that of the financial 
regulators. For example, the main federal consumer finance regulator, the 
CFPB, balances accountability for both supervision and enforcement of 
laws related to consumer financial products.319 Supervision is staffed with 
examiners—rather than lawyers—who regularly collect information outside 
the litigation process.320 The resulting free flow of information helps the 
CFPB understand how firms are generally going about their business and 
keeps the CFPB abreast of new practices and products in the sector.  
Perhaps counterintuitively, the absence of a supervision program may 
actually be even more of an obstacle to identifying problematic behavioral 
law and economics practices in the retail goods sector than it is in consumer 
finance. As Professors Bar-Gill and Warren have noted, “[c]hanges in the 
credit card contract illustrate the growing sophistication of card issuers in 
 
and therefore, its collection of information largely depends on serving civil investigative demands 
on its targets). 
315 Id. at 3 
316 Id. 
317 Id. (“For the most part, from the moment the FTC-BCP contacts a target, the activity 
consists of lawyers serving papers on each other, parsing their words, and documenting their 
communications. The FTC-BCP can thus be said to operate within a ‘litigation model’ of 
regulation.”). 
318 See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 686-87 (2013) (“Big Data 
will change consumer habits in ways that we cannot fully foresee.”). 
319 See CFPB, GROWING OUR HUMAN CAPITAL: HUMAN CAPITAL ANNUAL REPORT 
TO CONGRESS 3 (2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_report_annual-
human-capital-report-to-congress.pdf. 
320 See id. at 15 (noting that the agency’s supervision team hired former state examiners and 
industry compliance professionals).  
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exploiting consumer imperfections.”321 Looking at the design of an individual 
good is less helpful in revealing how retailers leverage information technol-
ogies, scientific experimentation, and scale to cause subtle consumer 
decisionmaking errors.  
Importantly, outside–in information collection is insufficient to understand 
the other half of Rosch’s conditions for robust consumer protection: when 
consumers are behaving irrationally. As legal scholars such as Professor 
Schwartz have argued, the existing body of field-validated studies is insuffi-
cient to explain cognitively why consumers make the actual market purchases 
they do.322 Laboratory studies and surveys, such as those conducted by 
academics and the FTC’s own Bureau of Economics, are seen as providing 
insufficient bases for regulatory interventions because they may not reflect 
how consumers behave in actual markets.323 But retailers essentially have a 
monopoly on real-world laboratories—their stores—in which they alone can 
run experiments. 
Thus, the FTC’s regulatory design creates substantial asymmetries of 
information between it and the entities it must regulate. Retailers 
themselves regularly make decisions based on voluminous field experi-
ments. The FTC, on the other hand, must rely on academic studies that are 
often inconclusive and vulnerable to criticism as lacking real-world valida-
tion. Thus, the FTC has a limited basis for knowing whether consumers are 
making irrational or uninformed choices. It also cannot know precisely what 
firms are doing to capitalize on consumer irrationality and misinformation. 
The agency consequently has done precisely what Professor Schwartz has 
advocated: refrained from cognitive-based regulation.324 
D. Summary: Existing Institutions Inadequately Protect Consumers 
The current regulatory framework for goods is thus poorly designed for 
addressing systemic market failures related to behavioral economics and 
information asymmetries. Congress gave the FTC the power to regulate the 
 
321 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 6, at 46. 
322 See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 9-10 (arguing that regulators lack a theory of cognitive function 
that enables them to predict when consumers will make the mistakes that laboratory subjects make). 
323 See id. at 10 (“[C]onsumers may make better decisions than laboratory subjects because 
consumers may be experienced while the subjects commonly face the experimental task for the 
first time.”). Nor can academics or regulators typically attain reliable answers from field data 
available publicly, which presents difficulties in establishing causality and isolating variables. See 
id. at 10-12 (noting difficulties determining causation of consumer choices given numerous 
potential bias influences). 
324 See id. at 11 (arguing that due to a “lack of a cognitive theory,” regulators “cannot sensibly 
make direct inferences from subjects’ laboratory choices to consumers’ market choices”). 
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sale of goods because it rightly recognized that legislatures, judges, and state 
agencies could not do the job alone.  
Yet, the FTC has, perhaps understandably, given its institutional design, 
balked at using those powers. Its emphasis on ex post enforcement drives it 
toward narrow legal analyses that obscure market-level complexity, aggregate 
harm, and sector-wide solutions. Most problematic of all, the extreme 
enforcement focus has obscured the need for the regulatory tool around 
which consumer finance is centered: institutional supervision. The starting 
point for sound regulatory decisionmaking is the best information available. 
The FTC lacks that crucial input. 
 V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The regulatory framework for consumer protection in retail goods needs 
to be overhauled. There is evidence of widespread practices that make it 
difficult for consumers to make rational and informed decisions, potentially 
causing them great harm. Yet, while the current regulatory framework 
provides the FTC with the power to regulate such practices, it does not 
provide the tools to determine whether such power should be exercised and, 
if so, how. A new framework should thus be considered to bring consumer 
protection in consumer goods closer in line with that in consumer finance.  
Fortunately, it is possible to implement this new framework without 
congressional action if FTC leadership decides to redesign its regulatory 
approach.325 I propose that the FTC consider creating a supervision 
program in which non-lawyers periodically collect firms’ internal infor-
mation about pricing practices. This would enable the agency to place 
greater emphasis on sector-wide ex ante rulemaking aimed at supporting 
consumer decisionmaking, and thus competitive markets.  
In a certain sense, the core of what is currently needed in the consumer 
goods sector to address the immense sophistication gap between firms and 
consumers is the inverse of what was needed for consumer finance in the 
wake of the 2008 crisis. Then, the answer was to create a bureau to pay more 
attention to consumer protection, which was arguably being neglected due 
to the regulatory focus on supervising firms to ensure institutional safety 
and soundness. In contrast, the consumer goods sector has a regulatory 
body—the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection—that focuses solely on 
consumer protection. The regulator, however, does not supervise firms.  
 
325 Though the FTC has never had a supervision program, it has exercised the same underlying 
powers of information collection and withstood legal challenge against those information 
collection efforts. See supra subsection IV.C.2. 
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A. Redesigning for Institutional Supervision 
To address the FTC’s lack of knowledge about practices that leverage 
behavioral economics and information asymmetries, the FTC might 
consider developing a supervision program loosely modeled after that in 
consumer finance protection. From their early days, bank supervision 
programs had the ability to request non-public information to determine 
whether a bank was complying with the law.326 This power was necessary 
because it was not possible to determine compliance from publicly available 
information. As discussed above, it is not possible to understand mass retail 
goods firms’ technologically and scientifically driven behavior from publicly 
available information. A supervision program would enable the FTC to 
make crucial regulatory decisions that it currently cannot. 
Three basic design features would be important to consider: (1) emphasizing 
ex ante rulemaking; (2) collecting firms’ data through remote monitoring, 
rather than with in-person examiners often seen in consumer finance; and 
(3) facilitating psychological studies to complement firms’ knowledge gaps 
about consumers’ rationality. 
First, the supervision program would feed into more comprehensive ex 
ante regulation in several ways. Information would flow more freely than it 
currently does because supervision occurs outside antagonistic legal 
processes. The free flow of information would be aided by the fact that the 
FTC’s internal reports based on that information would be considered by 
courts as privileged and highly confidential. Rapid exchange of information 
is important for ex ante regulation because it enables questionable practices 
to be cut off as they develop, or even before they develop.327  
 
326 See generally Kris James Mitchener & Matthew Jaremski, The Evolution of Bank Supervi-
sion: Evidence from U.S. States (Oct. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.economichistory.ca/pdfs/2012/mitchener-jaremski.pdf. 
327 Because of the regular line of supervision communications, institutions have more of a 
voice in the regulatory process. They also may have higher levels of trust in supervision because 
the interactions do not occur in an adversarial context and the information is privileged. Thus, 
institutions may consequently be more compliant in handing over requested information and even 
checking with regulators to see if a new questionable practice is permitted. Cf. TOM TYLER, 
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) (empirically documenting how procedural elements such 
as having an opportunity to be heard and being treated fairly influence whether people obey the 
law in the criminal justice context). Alternatively, the free flow of information may simply cause 
the regulator to become more aware of a firm’s plans to adopt practices before they are implemented. 
Thus, from a dispute systems design perspective, a regulatory approach resting on supervision 
may constitute a lighter, more effective form of preventing and resolving disputes than would a 
litigation-centered model. Cf. NANCY H. ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND 
PROCESSES FOR MANAGING DISPUTES (2013) (describing how factors such as greater 
participation of all stakeholders and greater flow of information will increase the likelihood of 
success for a dispute resolution process). 
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The collection of this information outside the legal process also facili-
tates its use in a market-wide, rather than narrow, manner. When 
information is collected as part of a legal investigation, it is natural that it 
would be used in accordance with the problem-solving tools offered by legal 
analysis. Because non-lawyer examiners would collect supervisory 
information as part of an ex ante effort to understand market failures, the 
information would readily translate into a broad view of the problem and 
potential solutions. For example, industry-wide aggregate exam reports—
standard practice in consumer finance—help put firms on notice of nascent 
harmful practices that violate consumer protection laws. Additionally, 
industry-wide information collection would flow more smoothly into 
industry-wide rulemaking.  
This ex ante process is preferable to the current approach of waiting for 
adequate public information to reveal problematic practices—which often 
takes years—and only then stopping those practices through punitive 
enforcement proceedings that are incapable of delivering compensation for 
widely dispersed harms.328 In many ways it also constitutes a lighter form of 
regulation than does a litigation-centered model.329 
Second, a lighter touch remote model of supervision is more appropriate 
for the goods sector. The supervision model used for decades in finance is 
built around teams of non-lawyer examiners who take up residence at large 
financial institutions for months at a time, or, in the case of the largest 
banks, year-round.330 The foundation of in-person examinations is supple-
mented with remote information requests as needed. The goods sector 
should flip that model, having as its default the remote collection of 
 
328 See generally Complaint at 5, Intel Corp., No. 9341 (F.T.C. Dec. 16, 2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/091216intelcmpt.pdf (discussing ten years of 
anticompetitive practices by Intel that resulted in higher prices for consumers, and ultimately led 
to an FTC enforcement action). 
329 This approach results in lighter regulation compared to a litigation-heavy approach. For 
instance, if noncompliance is found by supervision examiners, the supervision arm would, with 
approval from FTC leadership, be able to come to a settlement agreement requiring the firm to 
refrain from certain practices and to pay a fine or compensate consumers as appropriate. The 
proceeding can remain confidential at the agency’s discretion, with supervision agreements 
typically released only in aggregate reports. Though the agency may bring suit through its 
enforcement arm if necessary, this would probably not be required because regulated consumer 
companies have strong incentives to avoid the negative publicity that comes from litigation. This 
saves both regulatory and firm resources that might otherwise be spent on litigation. 
330 This ongoing examination is sometimes seen as burdensome, and there have been calls for 
examinations only when there is evidence of wrongdoing. See Craig Boyd Garner, Comment, 
Unconstitutional Regulatory Seizures Under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 
1991: The Final Blow to the Business of National Banks, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 131, 162 n.227 (1994) 
(noting that “the regulatory burden on the banking industry is more than $17.5 billion a year in 
compliance costs” and that a detailed regulatory scheme creates inefficiencies). 
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information, and only supplementing that with in-person examinations as 
necessary. This approach would enable limited regulatory resources to reach 
a representative array of retailers and manufacturers that shape the sector’s 
pricing strategies. Crucially, it would encourage using the collected infor-
mation at the industry-level, rather than focusing too narrowly on any one 
product, practice, or institution. 
A light-touch approach would also largely involve collecting the synthesized 
results of firms’ big data analyses and field experiments. Institutions already 
convert the output of their analyses into digestible reports for internal 
consumption, which would make the production and consumption of such 
information less burdensome for firms to produce and for regulators to 
consume.  
For example, consider the case in which the FTC learns that 40% of 
consumers redeemed a manufacturer’s rebates. By operating a regular 
supervision program, the FTC would have data about what might be 
driving non-redemption and could determine whether it is harmful or 
benign.331 The FTC could look at historical figures for rebate redemption at 
a particular manufacturer, or practices across manufacturers, to see if there 
are variations. This process could uncover that redemption rates decreased 
over time as more complicated rebate practices have emerged. The FTC 
might, for example, learn that the manufacturer had experimented with 
several different rebate forms, the more complicated of which led to 40% 
rather than 60% redemption. This would suggest that a deliberate choice by 
the firm for greater complexity may have caused some consumers who 
wanted to redeem not to do so. This may, depending on the FTC’s 
knowledge of the given practice, be enough for regulatory action. With 
access to results from experiments across retailers, the FTC would be able 
to draw on studies from one business to understand a practice at another—
thus developing empirically informed pattern recognition for practices that 
exploit consumer decisionmaking limitations.  
Third, when necessary, the FTC could also facilitate complementary 
consumer surveys or other experiments, perhaps with the help of academics, 
to fill in the gaps in retailers’ experiments.332 This is important because in 
some cases it may be unclear why consumers are paying higher prices as a 
result of a practice. For example, if internal data is inconclusive about 
whether consumers are rationally or irrationality deciding not to redeem 
 
331 If consumers are deciding not to redeem because their time is better spent elsewhere, and 
the rebate process is streamlined, this could be an example of rational non-redemption.  
332 The FTC is well-equipped to do this through its Bureau of Economics, which has 70 
Ph.D.-level economists. See Edwards, supra note 131, at 353.  
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rebates, the FTC may facilitate a customer survey to determine consumers’ 
intent upon purchasing products with rebates. Alternatively, it could request 
that the manufacturer test-run less complicated rebate procedures, used by 
other companies, to determine whether redemption rates are significantly 
affected.333 
Bringing this missing element to the consumer goods industry would 
place additional demands on the FTC. There is also an innate danger that 
the supervision program will be burdensome to business without making 
markets sufficiently more competitive. It is also possible that examiners 
would be captured.334 The supervision program’s design would need to 
weigh these and other risks. Any such program should be piloted and have 
its performance rigorously analyzed. A sunset provision may ensure that the 
program endures not because of inertia but because it has demonstrated 
value.335 
The potential gains to consumers and society by removing widespread 
market failures in a $3 trillion sector are large. Supervision programs 
already inform regulators in other spheres, such as consumer finance and 
occupational health and safety. Such efforts could similarly usher in an era 
of more informed regulatory decisionmaking in consumer goods.  
B. Sector-Level Rulemaking: Information Disclosures 
An FTC supervision program would enable the agency to better understand 
systematic harm from limitations on consumer decisionmaking. Identifying 
industry-wide information disclosures that enable consumers to make better 
decisions would be one important application of this knowledge.336 This 
 
333 If a large number of consumers purchase an item at $10 assuming they would receive a $2 
rebate, but do not cash in that rebate because of forgetfulness, this could be an example of 
supracompetitive pricing causing the consumer to pay a 25% higher price due to a cognitive 
limitation—consumers thought they would pay $8, and wound up paying $2, or 25%, more. 
334 Following the 2008 financial crisis, there was a move toward greater political oversight of 
agencies. See Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation, 101 CALIF. L. 
REV. 327, 332 (2013) (finding a “move away from regulatory independence and toward greater 
political involvement in postcrisis banking regulation”).  
335 See Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark (arguing that given the uncertainty under 
which regulators operate, sunset provisions could be a helpful solution), in REGULATORY 
BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 86, 99-100 (Cary 
Coglianese ed., 2012). 
336 The FTC has the authority to issue rules mandating disclosures under its existing 
rulemaking authority. The FTC has previously issued rules requiring information disclosures. See, 
e.g., Nat’l Petrol. Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 673-74, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding the 
FTC’s decision to require disclosure of gasoline octane ratings); Stephanie Schwab, Disclosures For 
Bloggers And Brands, SOCIAL MEDIA EXPLORER (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.socialmediaexplorer. 
com/social-media-marketing/disclosures-for-bloggers-and-brands/, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
 
  
2015] Helping Buyers Beware 1387 
 
section discusses two categories of such reforms: those directed at technolog-
ical intermediaries, and those directed at consumers. 
1. Disclosures for Technological Intermediaries 
The FTC should require large retailers to make their brick-and-mortar 
pricing and product information digitally available. Currently, retailers have 
an information monopoly on this data, preventing third-party technological 
applications from providing consumers with highly sophisticated shopping 
tools. With pricing and product data, technological intermediaries could 
aggregate and leverage market information to provide optimal purchasing 
recommendations to consumers. For instance, a consumer would be able to 
input information such as item(s) to be purchased, the maximum number of 
stores, and the means of transportation. The application would then present 
several shopping trip options that would each provide a list of which items 
to purchase at which stores, the total price including transportation costs, 
and the estimated amount of time spent.  
A secondary information disclosure that would similarly help realize the 
potential of such third-party software applications would be to require 
retailers to share consumers’ own purchase data with the consumers upon 
request.337 The consumer could then choose to share this data with third-
party intermediaries. This is already implemented in the United Kingdom, 
and has led to the creation of software applications that help people lose 
weight and track their spending. If combined with store pricing disclosures, 
consumer-specific loyalty card information would enable shopping 
applications to offer even more advanced guidance, including more personalized 
shopping recommendations.  
Unlike in consumer finance—where products are inherently complex 
even with the help of a third-party intermediary—in consumer goods such 
information could be rapidly integrated by existing third-party intermediaries 
and consumers. With goods, however, a greater portion of the complexity 
could be removed because the results of the intermediary’s analysis would 
be delivered in a simple manner—the total cost and time of a shopping trip. 
Also, the Internet has become an important means of comparing prices and 
learning about goods, with two-thirds of smartphone owners planning to 
use their mobile devices in their shopping in 2013.338 Similarly, about 
 
F73Y-7YJ9 (outlining the FTC’s new rule requiring bloggers and online writers to disclose 
connections to brands or products endorsed). 
337 For a similar proposal requiring disclosures in the credit card market, see BAR-GILL supra 
note 5, at 111. 
338 Harris, supra note 65. 
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two-thirds of consumers are very interested in mobile shopping applica-
tions that save time and money.339 Numerous price comparison applications 
for goods are already in place, with one of them alone having been 
downloaded 27 million times.340 
There are several potential downsides to mandated electronic price 
disclosure. One risk is that it could have anticompetitive effects, including 
being used by retailers for collusion.341 If true, this would likely make the 
drawbacks of mandated disclosures outweigh the benefits. However, this is 
less of a concern in the retail goods context because retailers already regularly 
monitor competitors’ price information, a process made more feasible by 
retailers’ sophistication and scale.342 Moreover, price collusion is regulated 
through antitrust mechanisms that are set up to monitor such illegal 
activities. Consequently, concerns about collusion should not prevent 
mandated price disclosures to third parties. 
A potential drawback is that pricing disclosures might be less helpful to 
lower-income consumers. This cross-section of the population has lower 
usage rates for smartphones and information technologies and consequently 
might have a harder time directly adopting new technologies. Technological 
intermediaries thus risk increasing consumption inequality. At the same 
time, low-income consumers who adopt the technology would have the most 
to gain. Also, such applications could bring to markets the missing critical 
mass of sophisticated shoppers that Professors Schwartz and Wilde suggest 
would bring benefits to non-adopters of the technology.343 
Finally, it would be important to weigh the costs to retailers of making 
their prices, items, and loyalty card data available digitally to third parties. 
It is likely that doing so would impose minimal costs. Large retailers already 
have this information in centrally accessible digital formats. Developing an 
interface would be a relatively small expenditure given retailers’ immense 
 
339 Phil Hendrix, Survey: The Mobile Shopping Apps Consumers Value Most, GIGAOM RES. (Oct. 
31, 2013), http://research.gigaom.com/report/survey-the-mobile-shopping-apps-consumers-value-
most, archived at http://perma.cc/G345-ELCL. 
340 The application is called Red Laser. See Barr, supra note 61 (explaining how Red Laser has 
gained popularity by using consumers’ context and location to improve shopping experiences).  
341 For a similar concern in the context of mandating margin disclosure, see Ian Ayres & F. 
Clayton Miller, “I’ll Sell It to You at Cost:” Legal Methods to Promote Retail Markup Disclosure, 84 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1047, 1080 (1990) and Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated 
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 738 (2011). 
342 One method for gathering weekly price information shared among major retailers is 
through Nielsen scanner data. See About Us, NIELSEN, http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/about-
us.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8AXQ-59XG (describing a service 
that gathers and sells a wide variety of data about consumers). 
343 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.  
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size. Indeed, retailers in select cities have made such information available 
for delivery services.344 
With access to the right information, technological intermediaries are 
poised to significantly improve consumers’ sophistication levels. A policy 
providing them with such information is attractive because of its political 
feasibility, minimal burden, and potential to correct significant market 
failures.  
2. Disclosures to Consumers 
a. Mandated Consumer Unit Pricing  
Regulators should require large online and brick-and-mortar retailers to 
display unit pricing and should take steps to ensure effective labeling. 
Studies suggest that consumers use per-unit price information to purchase 
lower-priced goods.345 Yet only nine states currently have laws requiring 
mandatory per-unit pricing of some goods, and unit pricing is not required 
of online retailers.346 
 Even in states with mandatory unit pricing, competing items are often 
listed at different unit rates—for instance, pricing one tea product by quart 
and another per one hundred tea bags or providing price per dissimilarly 
sized paper towels.347 And batteries’ unit price is calculated per battery, even 
though they have greatly varying life that is uncorrelated with price.348 
Batteries of one brand can last up to six times longer than batteries of the 
same type from another brand—a factor that is completely unconnected to 
price.349 Investigations by consumer watchdogs have found that unit pricing 
calculations are often simply wrong.350 An issue with even a small percentage 
 
344 Google has convinced retailers in several major cities to share this data so that the company 
can purchase goods from the stores and deliver them to consumers. But retailers have yet to 
release such data for direct consumer research purposes, and not all retailers are participating. 
Adams, supra note 71. 
345 See, e.g., José Luis Méndez García de Paredes et al., Unit Price Information on the Reference 
Price Formation, 22 J. PRODUCT & BRAND MGMT. 413, 413-15 (2013) (explaining how availability of 
per-unit price information affects consumers’ purchasing decisions and reference prices). 
346 See A Guide to Retail Pricing Laws and Regulations, supra note 99. An additional ten states 
have voluntary guidelines for unit pricing. Id. 
347  See Melanie Pinola, How the Unit Pricing Labels in Stores Can Trick You into Spending More, 
LIFEHACKER (Oct. 3, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://lifehacker.com/how-the-unit-pricing-labels-in-
stores-can-trick-you-int-1641793755, archived at http://perma.cc/9W7U-JRZK (cataloging the ways 
in which unit pricing can mislead consumers, including basic math errors).   
348 POUNDSTONE, supra note 58, at 179-80. 
349 Id. 
350 Pinola, supra note 347. 
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of unit labels leads to incorrect decisions or necessitates that consumers 
double-check all unit pricing. Either outcome defeats the labels’ purpose.  
Thus, for unit pricing to be effective, it should be standardized through 
industry guidelines and vigorously enforced by regulators. Doing so would 
significantly expand the presence and usefulness of unit pricing and would 
make consumers more effective decisionmakers. 
b. Including Tax in Shelf Price  
Another rule worth considering is requiring retailers to display products’ 
full prices, including tax. Field studies suggest that consumers do not fully 
factor tax into their purchase decisions, even when they are generally aware 
of the sales tax rate that they will pay.351 Including the tax in the shelf prices 
would thus reduce some level of consumer misperception and make the 
price slightly more salient, because, as a general principle, the higher the 
price the more salient it is.  
Excluding tax may, at least on the margins, make it more likely that 
some price-sensitive consumers will make purchases that they cannot 
actually afford.352 Full-price labeling may also influence choice among items 
due to different tax rates on different items in some states. Many states, 
such as New York, exempt most food from sales tax but tax less desirable 
categories of food, such as candy, soft drinks, and alcohol.353 This may have 
a perverse impact: if the consumer is not fully factoring in tax, the relative 
price of candy and soft drinks will appear more attractive relative to fruits 
and vegetables than it actually is.  
At the same time, there are also several potential drawbacks of mandating 
the inclusion of taxes in shelf prices. First, there would be a one-time 
implementation cost of changing systems and prices to include the taxes. 
Second, a perceived increase in prices—even if due to more accurate 
representation—may deflate consumer spending. Further, there is also the 
possibility that tax coffers could be lowered as consumers cross state borders 
or switch to items that have lower taxes. 
 
351 See Chetty et al., supra note 140, at 1146 (studying how sales tax affects consumer purchasing 
decisions and finding that when sales tax is not included in product labels, nearly all consumers 
ignore it when calculating the total price of a basket of goods).  
352 Consumers generally purchase fewer of many items as price increases. See MANKIW, 
supra note 47, at 11 (“[B]uyers look at the price when determining how much to demand . . . .”). 
This is especially true for discretionary items, such as soft drinks, junk food, and entertainment 
products. 
353  Listings of Taxable and Exempt Foods and Beverages Sold by Food Stores and Similar 
Establishments, TAX BULL. (N.Y. State Dep’t Taxation & Fin., Taxpayer Guidance Div., 
Albany, N.Y.), Apr. 13, 2011, at 1. 
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c. Limits on Disclosures to Consumers 
Mandated information disclosures directly to consumers do have signifi-
cant limitations. Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider have most promi-
nently highlighted the dismal track record, arguing that among other 
drawbacks consumers are consistently unable to process mandated disclo-
sures as intended.354 While debiasing can work in some instances, success is 
context-specific.355 In the consumer goods context, debiasing is likely to 
have only partial success due to the many different practices and goods 
involved, rapid sales practice innovation aimed at profiting from biases, and 
because people tend to believe they are not susceptible to being fooled.356 
Also, given the large number of consumer goods purchases made, disclo-
sures risk complicating the decisionmaking process further by adding more 
information.357 Finally, they could give policymakers the illusion of having 
solved a problem that actually requires more serious prohibitions, or at least 
create this false impression for constituents.358  
Despite these limitations, the specific types of disclosures proposed 
above match those believed to be most effective by Ben-Shahar, Schneider, 
and others: disclosures with simple and minimal information, such as a 
single number, like in-unit pricing.359 And, in the case of technological 
intermediaries and tax inclusion in the price, the mandate would have a 
simplifying effect on decisionmaking. Thus, despite general limitations, the 
disclosures described above have great potential to enhance competitive 
pricing in consumer goods markets by empowering better decisionmaking.  
 
354 See generally Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 341 (exploring the failure of mandated 
disclosure as a technique to protect personal autonomy); see also Jolls et al., supra note 12, at 1542 
(“[H]aving information per se does not automatically imply optimal behavior.”). 
355 See generally Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 199 (2006) (discussing methods for debiasing in various contexts). 
356 See POUNDSTONE, supra note 58, at 13-14 (mentioning warnings to people not to let the 
random numbers influence their answers did not prevent anchoring effect); Jolls et al., supra note 
12, at 1527 (“Unfortunately, such debiasing techniques appear either to have no effect on decisions 
or to reduce hindsight bias by only a limited degree, leaving a significant gap between ex post and 
ex ante decisionmaking.”); see also Bubb & Pildes, supra note 35, at 1649-53 (arguing failure of 
“sophistication by disclosure” approach due to overconfidence and ability of businesses to exploit 
even a smaller remaining bias, and also mentioning minimal impact from disclosure from field 
studies).  
357 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 341, at 721 (noting an inverse relationship 
between the amount of data available and a person’s ability to use it). 
358 See id. at 749 (concluding that prohibitions “are sometimes inevitable and cannot be side-
stepped by opting for seemingly easier solutions in the disclosure paradigm”).  
359 See id. at 743 (“[B]rief, simple, easy disclosures are at least preferable.”). 
  
1392 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 1311 
 
CONCLUSION 
Existing evidence suggests firms selling consumer goods, like those selling 
financial products, are systematically exploiting consumer irrationality and 
information asymmetries. As a result, families pay higher prices for goods. 
The empirical literature indicates this may amount to hundreds of dollars 
annually even for a family at the poverty line. The scale of this harm to 
consumers is made possible in large part by the rise of scientifically and 
technologically advanced large firms that have transformed their stores into 
laboratories of behavioral experimentation.  
The main actors in previous generations of consumer protection—
enforcement lawyers, deliberative legislatures, and local agencies—still have 
important roles to play but are inadequate for governing the modern retail 
sector. Nor has the FTC fully exercised its statutory authority to evolve its 
consumer protection powers with markets. A central obstacle to the exercise 
of this authority has been a lack of information about the underlying 
problem. Retailers alone hold the keys to the most reliable field data, and 
the FTC has chosen not to examine that data, despite being able to do so.  
It would be wasteful and impractical for regulators to attempt to create 
their own large-scale field experiments and armies of data scientists. Rather, 
to regulate effectively they will need to leverage firms’ sophistication. I 
propose they do so by creating a light-touch supervision program to regularly 
collect firms’ market insights. Once they have a better sense of systemic 
problems, regulators will be better situated to think more holistically about 
solutions. One potentially high-impact policy move would be to require 
large retailers to make their pricing data digitally available to third-party 
private sector software applications.  
The consumer goods industry may be unusually well positioned for 
correcting market failures through holistic information disclosures aimed at 
consumers and third parties. But supervision more broadly enables regula-
tors to understand problems that are impenetrable if solely looking at firms’ 
actions from the outside. Other sectors driven by sophisticated institutions, 
such as telecommunications and other services, might similarly benefit from 
supervision programs. The gains to society in terms of efficiency, distribution 
of wealth, and consumer welfare could be substantial.  
